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The first two chapters of my dissertation are essays on estimation of procurement auctions
with secret reserve prices. In the last chapter, I develop a test on strong disposability versus weak
disposability for non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimators.
In auctions with secret reserve prices, the possibility that the item goes unsold in the first
round generates a particular form of multi-round auction in which information on bids is revealed
after each round. If bidders have an imperfect estimate of project costs, the information revealed by
observing the bids of others in the previous round can mitigate the classic winner’s curse problem
that arises when firms’ costs share a common component. Using data from the Indiana Department
of Transportation (INDOT), I test for the existence of a common value component and analyze how
releasing bid information helps to cure the winner’s curse using reduced form analysis and structural
estimation. I find that the common value component in bidders’ costs have a more important role
in round 1 than later rounds. The released bid information cures the winner’s curse by providing
bidders with more accurate cost estimates. Counterfactural studies indicate that using secret reserve
prices benefits a government under a common value paradigm as opposed to public reserve prices.
Previous studies on multi-round procurement auctions assume bidders are risk neutral and
myopic. I make the extension by allowing bidders being risk averse and forward looking. Using the
data from INDOT, I estimate the structural model with myopic bidders and detect risk aversion
of bidders. I then estimate the model with forward looking bidders. Using results of structural
estimation, I conduct a series of counterfactual studies to address the following question: which
of the following is the best selling mechanism in terms of the government expenditure and the
probability of no sell, auctions with public reserve prices, secret reserve prices, no reserve price or
some other format?
Non-parametric DEA estimators have been widely applied in analyses of productive effi-
ii
ciency. However, most existing empirical studies have assumed strong disposability of inputs and
outputs. This constitutes a restriction which should be test with data. Using methods developed
in [Kneip et al., 1998] and [Kneip et al., 2008], this paper derives the rate of convergence and the
asymptotic distribution of DEA estimator under the weak disposability assumption. With the infor-
mation about the rate of convergence and the asymptotic distribution of DEA estimator under both
strong disposability and weak disposability, I can test the weak disposability assumption against the
strong disposability assumption applying the central limit theorem results of [Kneip et al., 2013] and
using the similar method as in [Kneip et al., 2014]. Monte Carlo results illustrating the performance
of the test in terms of size and power are also presented.
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Chapter 1
Curing the Winner’s Curse: Secret
Reserve Prices in Common Value
Procurement Auctions
1.1 Introduction
While reserve price policies are known to significantly impact auction behavior and perfor-
mance, there is surprisingly little consensus across U.S. state transportation departments regard-
ing the optimal procurement design. Although engineers’ cost estimates (ECE) are typically used
for determining reserve prices, when they are announced and how they are used varies greatly.
[De Silva et al., 2008] pointed out that across the 50 states in the United States, there are seven
different policies on engineers’ cost estimates (ECE) information release. Governments use ECE of
projects as reserve prices for the auctions. The most commonly used ECE policy is to only release
ECE after the bidding has taken place, and this policy is the same as using secret reserve prices.
Fifteen states are currently using this policy. There are eight other states that release ECE infor-
mation prior to the auction taking place, and this policy is the same as using public reserve prices.
Although every state claims that one type of ECE policy is used, any states could apply a no reserve
price policy if the winning bid is always higher than the ECE.
Procurement auctions with secret reserve prices become multi-round auctions because the
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auction continues to an additional round whenever the lowest bid received is higher than the reserve
price. Multi-round auctions have a unique feature of revealing extra information after each round,
i.e., bidders observe all bids from the prior round before the next round starts.1 Extra information
on bids can provide bidders with more accurate cost estimates when a bidder does not know his
true cost perfectly (also known as the common value assumption). Due to bidders’ uncertainties on
their true costs, the winner tends to be the one who underestimates his cost the most. A failure
to notice this can result in bidding too low (winner’s curse). Bidders are aware of this and in
equilibrium they overbid (winner’s curse effect), and this leads to higher government expenditure.
Bidders’ uncertainties reduces as additional information releases. Therefore, the winner’s curse effect
is mitigated.
Instead of making an independent private value (IPV) assumption as is typical in studies of
highway procurement auctions, I assume that cost functions for bidders have a common value (CV)
component and a private value (PV) component as in [Hong and Shum, 2002], which is more realistic
and testable. The CV component can exist in highway procurement auctions since: (i) bidders bid
on the same project, hence essential construction materials, landscape and weather conditions can
incur some costs which are approximately identical for all of the bidders; (ii) instead of being fully
aware of the true cost to accomplish a complicated project ex ante, a bidder submits a bid relying on
the cost estimated by engineers based on some privately known signals. Other bidders may possess
relevant information which would affect a particular bidder’s cost estimates, if known. Due to the
unique feature of revealing information, presence of CV components in multi-round procurement
auctions with secret reserve prices results in more interesting consequences as opposed to single
round auctions.2
This paper tests following hypotheses: (i) a CV component exists; (ii) bidders’ uncertain-
ties over the cost reduce as more information releases; (iii) the winner’s curse effect drops as the
uncertainties reduce. (ii) and (iii) are intuitive but hard to test empirically, since in general other
bidders’ private information is hard to access. Yet, this is available (all bids from the prior round)
in multi-round auctions. Using data from INDOT, the first part of this paper provides support for
these hypotheses using a reduced form analysis. The relationship between the number of bidders
1In contrast, public reserve prices policy reveals some information (reserve prices) before auctions start.
2[Ji and Li, 2008] study multi-round auction under the IPV assumption, in which the only useful information (for
non-strategic reasons) from the prior round is the lowest bid since it provides an upper bound of the secret reserve
price. In contrast, all bids from prior rounds can be useful to bidders in CV.
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and bid amounts is commonly used to detect the common value component.3 Controlling for auction
level fixed effects, I find: (i) on average bid amounts increase (decrease) as the number of bidders
increases in (after) round 1; (ii) information from the previous round has a significant impact on
current bids, including not only the minimum amount of bids, but also the maximum, variance and
kurtosis. Finding (i) supports hypothesis (i)-(iii), and finding (ii) also supports hypothesis (i).
The reduced form analysis provides qualitative evidence, but no direct quantitative evidence,
for the hypotheses. For instance, I do not know by how many the winner’s curse effects drop after
revealing information. Thus, a structural estimation is necessary. With results from the structural
estimation, the winner’s curse effects can be simulated. Additionally, the policy related questions
can be answered by counterfactual studies, i.e., which is a better selling mechnism, public, secret,
or no reserve prices.
In the two-step estimation procedure, I first estimate the reserve price distribution. Adopt-
ing a similar structural model developed in [Hong and Shum, 2002], I next estimate cost distribution
using results from the first step. The estimate of the common value component in the cost distri-
bution has a larger variance in round 1 than in subsequent rounds, which indicates that bidders
bidders act as if they have greater uncertainty about the common cost component in round 1. Given
the presence of a common value component, the severity of the winner’s curse is expected to depend
on the number of bidders in the auction. Using a similar idea to [Haile et al., 2006], I simulate
the winner’s curse effects with different numbers of bidders and find that the winner’s curse effects
increase as the number of bidders increases in both rounds. However, the increments are largely
diminishing after round 1. To investigate effects of bids from prior rounds on variances, I estimate
a new specification in which variances are functions of observed auction level characteristics and
information from the prior round. I find that information from the prior round significantly affects
variances of both common value and private value component as well as the mean of those. Thus,
information from the prior round plays a role in altering the cost structures across rounds.
Using results from the structural estimation, I find that a secret reserve price is preferable
to a public reserve price from a government’s perspective. Compared with public reserve prices, on
average the government expenditure is $81,610 (i.e., 4% of the mean level ex-post released reserve
price) lower and the probability of no sales is 3% lower with secret reserve prices. Compared with
3The common value component exists if bid amounts increase in the number of bidders. On the other hand, bid
amounts decrease in the number of bidders due to the competitive effect under IPV.
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no reserve prices, on average the government expenditure is $197,926 (i.e., 10% of the mean level
ex-post released reserve price) lower and the probability of no sales is 3% higher with secret reserve
prices.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature, and Section 3
presents the key assumptions of the model and derives the equilibrium bidding strategies. Section 4
describes the data set, and Section 5 examines the validity of the assumptions and show evidence of
the main hypotheses via a reduced form analysis. Section 6 explains structural estimation procedure,
and Section 7 reports the results. Section 8 describes the counterfactual analysis and Section 9
concludes. All proofs, tables and graphs are included in the Appendix.
1.2 Contribution to Literature
To date, most of the literature on highway procurement auctions makes a PV assumption.
Using data from the New Jersey Department of Transportation, [Hong and Shum, 2002] provide
empirical evidence for the existence of a common value components and find that this lead to a
winner’s curse situation in highway procurement auctions. They focus only on single round procure-
ment auctions with no reserve price. Many studies on procurement auctions focus only on this type
of auction, since they use data from the California Department of Transportation or other states
which have no reserve price. However, the most commonly used ECE policy in the United States
is the secret reserve price. [Ji and Li, 2008] study multi-round procurement auctions with secret re-
serve prices under an IPV assumption. This paper is the first to examine multi-round procurement
auctions with secret reserve prices under a CV assumption.
Previous studies have proposed formal empirical tests to determine whether observed bid-
ding behavior is more consistent with a CV or PV cost structure. However, these existing tests are
not well-suited for the setting here. For instance, the nonparametric test of CV versus PV proposed
by [Haile et al., 2006] suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Hence their method works better for
homogeneous auctions, yet auction level characteristics are important in this study. Tests devel-
oped in [Hendricks et al., 2003] and [Hill and Shneyerov, 2013] only work with public reserve price.
Therefore these tests are not appropriate with secret reserve price. Instead of applying a formal
structural test, this paper provides evidence supporting the main hypotheses with a reduced form
analysis as well as structural estimation under some parametric assumptions.
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Many papers use the relationship between the number of bidders and bid amounts to show
the existence of a common value component with reduced form analysis, for instance, [Paarsch, 1992]
and [Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003]. Unlike these studies, I study multi-round auctions which allow me
to control for auction level fixed effects. This greatly reduces unobserved auction level heterogeneities
which can produce unbiased estimators. In addition multi-round setting allows for a new way to
test PV versus CV with reduced form analysis. Under PV, bidders only cares minimum bid from
the prior round, but they should cares other bidding information too under CV.
The structural model in this paper closely follows [Wilson, 1998] and [Hong and Shum, 2002],
in which the bidder’s cost has both a common value and private value component (both compo-
nents are lognormally distributed). However, at least three features make this paper different from
[Hong and Shum, 2002] in terms of estimation strategies of the model: (i) I estimate the model with
secret reserve price, yet they do not have reserve price in their paper; (ii) I allow both the mean and
variance of the cost distribution depend on auction level characteristics and information from prior
rounds, but they assume that the mean and variance are fixed across aucions; (iii) instead of using
a quantile related method, I use simulated method of moment, which produces results that can be
easily interpreted and used in counterfactual studies at the expense of more computational burdens.
Which is the best reserve price policy for a government? For single round private value
auctions, [De Silva et al., 2008] find that public reserve prices outperform secret reserve prices, on
the contrary, [Ashenfelter, 1989], [Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003] and [Elyakime et al., 1994] provide
evidence in favor of secret reserve prices. For multi-round private value auctions, [Ji and Li, 2008]
show that a secret reserve price is a better choice with myopic bidders. [Wu, 2015] compares secret
reserve prices with various other policies for both risk averse myopic and forward looking bidders,
and the paper indicates that secret (public) reserve prices work better for a government with bidders
with a lower (higher) discount rate with forward looking bidders. However, none of these papers
answers the question for multi-round procurement auctions under a CV paradigm. This paper
contributes to the literature by answering the same question for multi-round procurement auctions
under a CV paradigm.
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1.3 Model
1.3.1 Model setup and key assumptions
In this paper, I focus on a CV paradigm with symmetric risk neutral bidders; particularly,
bidders’ costs have both common value and private value components. There are n myopic potential
bidders with limited memory in the game. Myopic bidders mean bidders that do not value the future,
even though they are aware of the possibility that an auction could proceed into the next round.
Hence, the fact that auctions may proceed into the next round does not affect bidders participation
or bidding decisions. Limited memory indicates that, in round j > 1, bidders summarize information
from the prior round in term of the minimum, maximum and first four central moments of bids in
round j − 1.4
At the beginning of the game, the seller, a government agency, has an engineering estimate
which is secret to all bidders until one of them wins the auction. This estimate serves as a reserve
price (R) to the auction. In this model, R is a random draw from G(·), namely the reserve price
distribution. I first assume:
Assumption 1. After R is drawn, it is fixed.
Assumption 1 prevents a government from altering R once drawn. For instance, a gov-
ernment although observing fewer participants, cannot reduce reserve prices because less severe of
the winner’s curse may lead to lower submitted bids. Observing that the lowest bid is higher than
the reserve price, the government does not raise the reserve price in order to make a quick sale.
Assumption 1-2 follows closely to [Ji and Li, 2008].
Assumption 2. All potential bidders submit a bid in round 1.
Assumption 2 means that there is no entry problem in the first round. Unlike public reserve
prices, one of the advantages of using secret reserve prices is to encourage participation. Hence,
bidders always enter in the first round if their capacity constraints are ignored. Each bidder in
auction ` draws his cost and signal in the first round from a joint distribution of cost and signals
Φ1l(·, ·). At the end of the first round, all bids are opened, ranked and released. If there are bids
4Auctions may have different number of bids in the previous round; however, I would like to include a fix number
of covariates representing information released from previous rounds. For many distributions, this information would
identify or over-identify the distribution of bids. For instant, for a normal distribution, one only needs the mean and
variance to recover the full distribution.
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that are lower than R, the bidder with the lowest bid wins. The reserve price is revealed and the
game ends. If there are no bids that is lower than R, then the game continues and proceeds into
round 2. For round j > 1, I assume the following, i.e.,
Assumption 3. Bidder i re-draws his cost cijl and signal xijl from Φjl(·, ·) in auction `.
Cost distributions in different rounds can be differentiated from each other for the following
reasons: (i) in round 2, all bidders have additional information (bids from the previous round), and
they can use that information to update the beliefs of cost structures; (ii) private value components of
their costs can change since bidders face different capacity constraints in each round; (iii) common
value components of costs can alter since the weather condition or the price of the construction
materials may change after one or two months.5 Unlike [Ji and Li, 2008] who assume cost draws are
independent across rounds, cost draws across rounds can be correlated in Assumption 3, since ci,j,`
depend on bids from round j − 1, which are correlated with ci,j−1,`.
1.3.2 Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Theorem 1 gives the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) under Assumption 1-3 and decom-
pose the BNE into the winner’s curse effects and the leftover competitive effects.6 Let βn,j(·) denote
the bidding strategy in round j for an auction with n bidders. Let s∗j denote the lowest bid in round
j. The reserve price distribution is denoted by G(·), and fn,j(·|·) (Fn,j(·|·)) denotes the conditional
density (distribution) of mink 6=ixk conditional on xi (signal for bidder i) in round j and given that
there are n bidders in the auction.


































5[Ji and Li, 2008] allow cost distributions to be different across rounds too. The sample used in round 1 is a pool
of all auctions, and the sample for later rounds only includes auctions that are unsold in round 1. Under a common
value paradigm, this update can be useful since bidders’ costs could depend on signals of the others. From the data,
almost all auctions going into the second round are resold at least a month after the first round. On average, this
number is about 54 dates.




cn,j(x, y) = E(ci,j |xi,j = x,min
k 6=i
xk,j = y), (1.3)
and cn,j(x, x) is the winner’s curse effect (increasing in n by definition) in round j and the leftover
term is the competitive effect (decreasing in n for large n).
See proofs of Theorem 1 in the Appendix. Notice for the j = 1 case, I set s∗0 = x̄, hence G(s
∗
0) = 1.
In Theorem 1, bidders are assumed not to strategically switch the ways of submitting bids after
they acquire bids information from the prior round. This information can only be used in updating
their beliefs about cost structures. This assumption simplifies the analysis by avoiding having to
disentangle effects of bid information from prior rounds on bidders’ bidding strategies and cost
estimates (beliefs of cost structures). This update of beliefs about cost structures may be important
for the following reasons: (i) new firms may lack experience in estimating costs, so revealing bids
information from prior rounds can be helpful for them; (ii) some firms are participating in many
projects in a month and may not have time to estimate costs precisely for all projects, hence revealing
information from prior rounds can help them to formulate better cost estimates; (iii) in complicated
projects bidders may improve the cost estimates via other bidders’ bids information.7
1.4 Data
This paper analyzes a data set of auctions held by the INDOT. The auctions are first-price,
sealed-bid auctions, while reserve prices are unknown to bidders before auctions are sold. An auction
proceeds as follows. The INDOT posts the notice to contractors to invite bids five weeks prior to
the bidding day. On the bidding day, each bidder submits a sealed bid knowing that the government
has a secret reserve price. Finally, the received bids are unsealed and ranked by the government
publicly.8 If the lowest bid in the auction is lower than the reserve price, the contract is then awarded
to that bidder. Otherwise the contract will be re-advertised and re-auctioned.
7After each round, detailed price and quantity information about construction materials from all bidders is revealed.
[Hong and Shum, 2003] study the English auction with common value components, in which bidders keep dropping
out and releasing their signals until there is only one remaining bidder. They allow bidders’ equilibrium bidding
strategies update with revealing signals of dropout bidders, but not the cost. Using their method is inappropriate
here for two reasons: (i) their method highly relies on second price auctions, but this study uses first price auctions;
(ii) instead of revealing sequentially, every bidder’s signal is revealed before round 2 in this study, which makes the
update of bidding strategy not work here.
8All bids received by INDOT are required to be released within 24 hours after the letting. The minimum date
difference between two rounds for the same auction is 3 days. Thus, bidders always have time to see all bids from the
prior round before submitting bids in the current round.
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The sample used in this paper is all auctions held by the INDOT from April 1999 to
December 2008.9 To avoid the complexity of entry and be consistent with the no entry assumption
(Assumption 3), for auctions proceeding into round 2, I only include those in which the bidders
in round j is a weakly subset of the bidders in round j − 1. For each auctioned contract, I have
the following observations: all bids with the bidders’ identities, the ex-post released reserve price,
the number of bidders, the number of projects associated with the contract, the number of working
days (or the letting date and the completion date), the DBE goal, and the price of the contract
information book.10
The data set consists of 4,711 lets and 20,190 bids. Refer to Table 1.1 in the Appendix for the
description of the variables and summary statistics of the data set. If one focuses on auctions with
at least two rounds, both bid amounts and the number of bidders decrease along with consecutive
rounds, i.e., (i) on average bids after round 1 are about 10% lower than bids in the first round; (ii)
number of bidders in the first round is twice as many as this number after round 1. The positive
relationship between bid amounts and the number of bidders can be explained by the existence of
winner’s curse effect due to common value components in bidders’ costs.11 Winning bids are lower
than ex-post released reserve prices in most of auctions (about 87%). In the ten years panel, 929 out
of 4,711 (20%) auctions are unsold in round 1, which illustrates that I have multi-round auctions.
I have information on bidders’ identities, which allows me to construct measures about
backlogs and bidders’ experiences (the number of auctions bidders have won and number of bids
submitted). However, there exists measurement errors for these measures since they are all left
truncated, since there is no information of auctions before 1999 available online from INDOT. All
of these measures are used in the reduced form analysis, but I do not include these measures in
structural estimation for the reason I will mention in the next section.
9There are four types of projects: bridge, road, maintenance and traffic projects. [Ji and Li, 2008] use data from
the INDOT, and they use one type of bridge project, i.e, bridge rehabilitation (year 1996-2004). [Wu, 2015] uses
bridge rehabilitation and bridge replacement projects from INDOT (year 1999-2013).
10DBE is short for Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, and see [Ji and Li, 2008] for formal definition. 5%
DBE means that if a non DBE firm wins the auction, then it has to hire some DBE firms and at least 5% of the
money from the government has to be transferred to the DBE firm. In general, the more expensive of the contract
information book, the more complex the project is. It is a similar measure as the number of pages of a contract or
number of items in a contract.
11Other potential explanations include (i) if a bidder stays in and submits a weak higher bid than the prior round,
he has no chance to win; (ii) if bidders are forward looking they may have higher markups in the first round if they
know that there is a possibility that the auction may go into the next round.
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1.5 Reduced form analysis
1.5.1 Evidence for the existence of a common value component
Many papers use the relationship between the number of bidders and bid amounts to detect
a common value component. When bid amounts increase (decrease) in number of bidders, the
winner’s curse effects from CV dominate (are dominated by) the competitive effects from PV. With
multi-round auctions I can control for auction level fixed effects. This greatly reduces unobserved
auction level heterogeneities which can produce unbiased estimators.
For the main analysis, I use the following bid function regression,
log(bi`j) = ζ1n`j + ζ2r`j + ζ3n`j × r`j +Z`,j−1ζZ +Wi`jζW + a` + εi`j , (1.4)
in which bi`j denotes bid from bidder i in auction ` for round j, n`j denotes the number of bidders
in auction ` for round j, r`j denotes the round 1 dummy (equals to 0 if in round 1, and 1 otherwise),
Z`,j−1 includes information from round j−1 in auction `, Wi`j includes the bidder level information
of bidder i in auction ` for round j and a` denotes auction level fixed effects.
12
In the left panel of Table 1.4, I exclude bidder level information. From the results, on
average bids are increasing with the number of bidders in the first round and decreasing as the
round progresses or as the number of bidders increases after round 1. These findings support the
main hypotheses. Bids increasing as the number of bidders increases in round 1 suggests the existence
of common value components. Bids decreasing as the number of bidders increases after round 1 is
consistent with IPV. Hence, common value components have less important roles after round 1.
Besides, not only the minimum, but also the maximum, standard deviation (SD) and kurtosis of
bids in previous rounds have significant impacts on current bids.13 This partially supports the
limited memory assumption; in other words, bidders care about some but not all of the prior rounds
bid information when they submit bids. Also, they remember more than just the minimum bid
from the last round, and that information should be irrelevant to bidders under a PV paradigm for
non-strategic reasons.
As the minimum and kurtosis of the bids in previous rounds increase, bids in the current
12Z`,j−1 includes the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of logrithm of bids
in the prior round.
13Only minimum, maximum and mean are highly but not perfectly correlated. The correlations between the first
four moments are not high.
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round increase on average, holding others constant. The minimum bid in last round plays a role
as an upper bound of bids for the current round; hence, on average, bids in the current round
decrease as the upper bound decreases.14 As kurtosis increases, extreme cases are more likely to
happen, if bidders are risk averse, they would rather overbid in order to compensate the potential
financial loss. On the other hand, as maximum and SD of previous bids increase, current bids
become lower on average. Bidders need variations across bids from the prior round to formulate
a better understanding of the joint distribution Φ(·, ·), hence they would have more accurate cost
estimates. Therefore, an increase of the SD of bids in the prior round leads a lower submitted bid
in the current round due to the mitigation of the winner’s curse. The coefficient of the maximum
has a similar interpretation, since the maximum partly measures the variation of bids holding the
minimum constant.15
Notice that when I control for auction level fixed effects, the variation of number of bidders
within an auction only exists when the auction has more than one round. Hence, only auctions
with multiple rounds contribute to the estimation results. This may change the interpretation of
estimates if the probability of proceeding to round 2 is not random. For instance, a positive sign on
estimates of ζ1 means that bid amounts increases as the number of bidders increases conditional on
the auction having multiple rounds. In Table 1.6, I report estimates from the following Logit model
with project type fixed effects,




where y` equals to 1 if auction ` is sold in round 1, and equals to 0 otherwise. X` includes observed
auction level characteristics in auction ` and t` is project type fixed effects. Only time span of the
project has a significant impact on whether an auction proceeds into round 2, and this partially
supports the random selection of auctions proceeding into round 2.
Studies on single round auctions can not control for auction level fixed effects. In Table 1.5,
14This is why the sign of coefficient on r`j is positive, since the minimum bid from the last round is already included.
15In the right panel of Table 1.4, I add the bidder level information. Results are quite similar to the previous
specification. Additionally, a firm with more previous wins and less backlogs bids lower on average, i.e., firms with
more construction experience and less capacity constraints bids more aggressively. Meanwhile, a firm with more
bidding experience on average bid higher, hold others constant. Notice that submitting more bids does not necessarily
imply that a bidder has more useful bidding experiences. For instance, a firm can participate in many auctions in one
month without carefully estimating costs, and this type of bidding does not help them accumulate experience. Yet,
the adjusted R2 has not increased much by including bidder level information.
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I present a similar analysis as in Table 1.4 but with project type fixed effects, i.e.,
log(bi`j) = α1n`j + α2r`j + α3n`j × r`j +Z`,j−1αz +X`αx +Wi`jαw + t` + νi`j . (1.6)
The signs of the three key coefficients stay the same as in the previous case, but the coefficients
on n`j and the interaction between n`j and r`j become less significant and smaller in magnitude.
The coefficients on n`j is not significant until bidder level information is included. Unobserved
auction heterogeneity correlated with number of bidders can bias the results. In case, this leads to
a downward bias for the coefficient on the number of bidders in round 1 and an upward bias on
the coefficient of the number of bidders after round 1.16 Adding bidder level information does not
improve model fitting much. Therefore, I will focus on a symmetric bidder case in this paper.
With auction level fixed effects, I find that bid amounts increase (decrease) in the number of
bidders in (after) round 1. Hence the winner’s curse effects from CV dominate (are dominated by) the
competitive effects from PV in (after) round 1. Yet, I do not know by how many the winner’s curse
effects drop after revealing information. These findings are qualitative but not quantitative and could
also be consistent with an affiliated private value situation described by [Pinkse and Tan, 2005],
which calls for structural estimation. However, as long as that the correlation between bidders’
signals does not change across rounds, the result of flipping signs of number of bidders in different
rounds can still be interpreted as that the common value component plays a less important role after
round 1, since the affiliation effect is absorbed by the auction level fixed effects.
1.5.2 Evidence for assumptions
To show some concrete evidence for fix reserve prices assumption (Assumption 2), I run the
following regression
log(R`) = δ1n` + δ2r` + δ3n` × r` +X`δX + t` + ξ`, (1.7)
in which R` denotes the reserve price for auction `. Neither the number of bidders nor dummy
variable for the rounds has a significant impact on reserve prices (see Table 1.2 in the Appendix),
16The omitted variable, complexity of the project, is positively correlated with bids. The more complex a project
is, the less bidders are qualified for it (negative correlation between n`1 and complexity of the project). However,
bidders are more willing to stay the more complex the project is once enter (positive correlation between n`j , j > 1
and complexity of the project), since both the fix cost of entry and the opportunity cost of exit are higher for a more
complex project.
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which provides support for the fixed reserve price assumption.
To give some evidence for the no entry assumption (Assumption 3), I estimate a zero trun-
cated negative binomial model with project type level fixed effects, i.e.,
Pr(n`1|X`, t`, n`1 > 0) = H(X`λX + t`), (1.8)
in which n`1 denotes the number of bidders of auction ` in round 1 and H(·) can be negative binomial
distribution.17 None of the observed auction level characteristics except dummy variables for project
type (t`) has a significant effect in explaining the number of bidders (see details in Table 1.3). Thus,
the number of actual bidders in round 1 can be considered the same as the number of potential
bidders within each type of projects. However, entry could become an potential issue when bidders
decide which type of projects to enter.
1.6 Structural estimation
1.6.1 Estimation strategy
Since reserve prices are not revealed when bidders submit bids, I estimate the reserve price
distribution first. I assume the density of reserve price for auction ` has the following form:







in which x` = {X`, t`}. The mean and variance of g(·) are determined by γ and σg.
Following [Wilson, 1998] and [Hong and Shum, 2002], in round j, each bidder i has a log-
additive form for cost function,
cij = aij × vj , (1.10)
in which aij is the private value component and vj is the common value component. Each bidder’s
noisy signal xij is a function of his own cost,
xij = cij × eij , (1.11)
17The data set does not include any auction that has no participant. I use a larger sample for this study than the
previous studies, i.e., I include the subsample violating the no entry assumption (Assumption 2).
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in which eij = e















e,j . For a simple two bidders case (n = 2), ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, the joint distribution of the
log(cij) and log(xij) in round j has the following form,







































This can be generalized into n > 2 case.19
For round j, given (1.12) and properties of multivariate normal distributions, fn,j(x|x) and
Fn,j(x|x) and cn,j(x, x) in (A.2) can be evaluated numerically in the same way as in [Hong and Shum, 2002].20
Given the first stage estimation of G(·) and equilibrium bidding function, I can use method of sim-
ulated moment (MSM) to estimate µj,`, σv,j , σa,j , and σe,j . In particular, µ1,` = x`θ1, and after
round 1, µ2,` = x`θ2 + Z`,j−1η, ∀j > 1. Since the number of observations after round 3 is too
small for structural estimation as in Table 3, unlike in reduced form analysis, I focus on j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
instead of using all observations.21 Due to the limited number of observations after round 1, I pooled
auctions lasting two and three rounds together.
In particular, the related moments are
E(bk1i`|n1`, g`(·),x`) = Mk1 (b1i`,x`,γ, σg;θ1, σv,1, σa,1, σe,1),
E(bkji`|c ≤ s∗j−1, nj`, g`(·),x`,Z`,j−1) = Mkj (bji`,x`,Z`,j−1,γ, σg;θ2,η, σv,2, σa,2, σe,2) (1.13)
in which bji` denotes the bid i in auction ` in round j, nj` denotes the number of bidders for auction
` in round j, and k denotes order of moment conditions.22 Mj can be solve by numerical integration.
18I drop i term by symmetry assumption. If σa,j = 0 (σ
2
v,j = 0), then I have pure CV (PV). As in
[Hong and Shum, 2002], the ratio between those two can be use to show whether CV or PV components in bid-
ders’ costs have more important role.
19I Assume that log(aij) ⊥ log(vj), log(aij) ⊥ log(a−ij), log(cij) ⊥ εij , and εij ⊥ ε−ij , in which −i denotes any
bidder, but not bidder i. I drop i term by symmetry assumption.
20GHK algorithm is applied to simulate cn,j(x, x) from a truncated conditional multivariate normal distribution. I
can evaluate fn,1(x|x) and Fn,1(x|x) at x by the method in [Tong, 1990].
21For the traffic type of project, there are no auctions lasting more than three rounds.
22For well-known identification issues in under common value paradigm, nj` ≥ 2 ∀ j and `. This is different than
reduced form analysis in which I include all auctions. Here, I choose to match the first three order moments to take
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ji` −Mkj (bji`,x`,Z`,j−1,γ, σg;θm,η,σm))2,m ∈ {1, 2}, (1.14)
where L1 = L1, L2 = L2+L3, and Lj denotes number of auctions in round j, Mk1 (b1i`,x`,Z`,j−1,γ, σg;θ1,η,σ1) =
Mk1 (b1i`,x`,γ, σg;θ1,σ1), and σm = {σv,m, σa,m, σe,m}.
1.7 Results
1.7.1 Reserve price distribution
I first estimate the fixed variance case in which changes of reserve price distributions across
auctions are just from the log-scale parameter (µg,l) as in (1.9). All the observed auction level
characteristics have positive effects on µg,l. Hence, both the mean and variance of the reserve price
distribution increase on average as any of the auction level characteristics increasing by the nature
of a lognormal distribution (see Table 1.7 for details).23
I then study a flexible variance case.24 Particularly, I specify that σg,` = e
x`γσ for auction
` and I have estimates of γ and γσ (see results in Table 1.8) To make comparison between this two
methods, I report summary of statistics of µg,l and σg,` under both methods in Table 1.9. In both
cases, for each auction `, I have an estimate of µg,`. Under a fixed variance case, σg,` = σg for all `.
In contrast, each auction ` has a distinct σg,` in a flexible variance case. The mean of estimated σg,`
in the flexible variance case is very close to the estimation of σg from the fix variance case. whereas,
the estimated µg,`’s across auctions are more spread out in the flexible variance case.
1.7.2 Cost and signal distribution
1.7.2.1 Fixed variance case
Neither of the moment conditions in (1.13) has an analytic expression; thus numerical
method is applied to solve (1.14). In the inner loop, I get numerical solution to the differential
the potential asymmetry issue mentioned in [Hong and Shum, 2002].
23For all results in this section, I use a subsample of original dataset, in which I have at least two bidders for the
selected auctions for the identification reason. I only lost a relatively small sample associated with 530 bids, and most
of them are from round 1.
24I study the flexible variance cases, since heteroscedasticity is detected in a reduced form analysis on reserve prices
and bids. This is not a huge issue in linear model, but it matters more in structural estimation.
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equation with various trials of parameter value, and for each trial, 100 simulations are made to
calculate the moments.25 In the outer loop, I search parameter values to solve (1.14).26
I first estimate the fixed variance case, in which the change of joint distribution across
auctions is just from the mean for each round (see Table 1.10 for results).27 In the left panel of
Table 1.10, all auction level characteristics have positive effects on µ1,` of the joint distribution. One
can infer that a common value component exists, and it dominates the private value component from
the ratio between σv,1 and σa,1. In the right panel, all auction level characteristics still have positive
yet smaller effects on µ2,` of the joint distribution due to adding bid information from prior round.
Notice that the maximum, mean and SD of bids in prior rounds have significant impact on µ2,`, but
not the minimum due to the fact that the effect of minimum bid from the prior round (s∗j−1) has
already been captured by the upper bound in (A.2) which I used in the moment condition, such as
in (1.13). In particular, µ2,` increases as the maximum and mean of bids in the prior round increase.
On the other hand, µ2,` decreases as the SD of bids in the prior round increase. If the mean of bids
is higher in round 1, bidders tend to think costs are higher under a CV scenario.
In round 2, a private value component plays a more important role than a common value
component from the ratio between σv,1 and σa,1, and effects from the noise of signals have dropped
too. After observing information released after round 1, bidders have a better understanding of
common value components and better costs estimates. Therefore, the variance of the noisy and
common value component drop in round 2 conditional on revealed information. In the mean time,
the variance for the private value component increases. Conditional on revealed information from
round 1, bidders’ costs estimates rely more on their own type. Therefore, bidders behave more like
in a PV paradigm.
With the estimation results, I simulate bids by solving (A.2) numerically. One can refer
to Figure 1.1 for simulated equilibrium bids with different number of bidders by rounds. With the
same level of signal, bids increase as the number of bidders increases in round 1. However, in round
2 simulated bids decrease as the number of bidders increases holding the signal level constant. This
partially supports my conjecture that the winner’s curse is less severe in round 2 compared with
25The ODE45 from Matlab is applied to find the numerical solution for the differential equation.
26To have a better chance for approaching globally minimization, I search the solution for the objective function
parallelly over 50 sets of initial values on Palmetto cluster. For each initial value, the solution was found iterative,
due to the large sample size, nature of simulated method and the 72 hours operation time restriction on the cluster.
In each iteration, I set the maximum of function evaluation and iteration times as 25 and record the estimates and
the associated current function value. Estimates from previous iteration d− 1 will serve as initial values in iteration
d, and the iteration stops until the difference of current function values from iteration d and d− 1 is small enough.
27Notice that I need estimation of G(·) in this estimation procedure, I use the fixed variance case here.
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round 1.
With the decomposition of BNE in Theorem 1, similar approach as in [Haile et al., 2006]
can be used to simulate the winner’s curse effect, hence provide evidence for main hypothesis. After
estimating the joint distribution, I can simulate cn(x, x). In Figure 1.2, given a certain level of signal,
the winner’s curse effect increases as the number of bidders increase in round 1; however, in round
2, the winner’s curse effect does not vary significantly with the number of bidders. Therefore, the
common value component and winner’s curse appears in round 1, whereas, in round 2 the common
value component is vanishing as well as the winner’s curse.
Till now, I have provided evidence of the structural changes of bidder’s cost between round
1 and round 2, but not reasons for these changes. From the results in Table 1.10, one can see that
released information influences the mean of the joint normal distribution in round 2 (µ2,`), but not
variances (σ2) directly. It is obvious that key terms determining CV or PV are the variances. This
calls for the next study where observed auction level characteristics and bid information from the
prior round can affect variances directly.
1.7.2.2 Flexible variances case
In this section, I estimate the flexible variance case, in which both the mean and variances
of the joint distribution are affected by auction level characteristics.28 Refer to Table 1.11 and Table
1.12 for results in round 1 and after round 1. In Table 1.11, all auction level characteristics have
positive and statistically significant effects on µ1,` of the joint distribution, and these findings are
consistent with the µ1,` estimates in the fixed variance case. The auction level characteristics have
less significant impact on σ1’s in general; however, on average, road and bridge projects tend to have
large σv,1 and σe,1 while smaller σa,1 comparing with the other two types of projects. Road and
bridge projects are usually more complex compared with the other two types, hence signals are more
noisy. Usually the material cost, the weather and landscape conditions are more important to road
and bridge projects, thus the variance for common value component is larger. In contrast, bidders’
specialties can play relatively more important roles in maintenance and traffic types projects.
In Table 1.12, some of the auction level characteristics still have positive but smaller effects
on µ2,`, such as the mean of the joint distribution in round 2, due to the reason of adding in bid
information from the prior round. Notice that the maximum, mean and SD of bid in the prior round
28I use estimates of G(·) from the flexible variance case.
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have significant impact on µ2,`, but not the minimum, which is caused by the fact that effects of the
minimum bid of the prior round (s∗j−1) have already been captured by the upper bound in (A.2)
which I used in the moment condition, namely (1.13). In particular, µ2,` increases as the maximum
and mean of bids in the prior round increase. On the other hand, µ2,` decreases as SD of bids in the
prior round increases. Most of the signs for µ2,` are consistent with results from the fixed variance
case. In terms of σ2’s, From Table 1.13(b), compared with round 1 results in Table 1.13(a), the
private value component plays a more important role than the common value component from the
ratio between σv,2 and σa,2 in round 2, and the noise of signal has dropped too.
29
In Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4, I plot simulated bids by project type for both rounds. The
reason I can do this is because that σm’s are varying with auction level characteristics in this case.
In round 1, simulated bids for road and bridge project vary more in terms of the number of bidders
compared with the other two types of projects. Meanwhile, these two types of projects have large
σv,1 while smaller σa,1 compared with the other two, which is indicated by results in Table 1.11.
After round 1, simulated bids with different number of bidders for road and bridge projects behave
more like the other two types of projects. Simulated bids after round 1 vary in terms of the number
of bidders with a much smaller scale. These two types of projects still have large σv,2 while smaller
σa,2 compared with the other two, but the gaps shrink which is indicated by Table 1.12.
The minimum bids of the prior round have positive significant effects on σv,2 and σa,2, but
the effect is larger on σv,2. As the minimum bid drops, the variances of both the private and common
value component drops on average holding the other constant. On the other hand, the mean of bids
from the prior round has significant negative effect on σv,2 and σa,2, but the effect is larger on σa,2.
Although on average both of the variances for the private and common value component increase
as the mean of bids from the prior round decreases holding the other constant, the effect is larger
for private value component. The maximum and SD also have significant effects on σv,2, but not on
σa,2. In particular, as the SD of bids from the prior round increases, the variance of the common
value component decreases. In general, information from prior rounds has greater impact on the
common value component than the other two components, which is intuitive since one expect that
bids information from the prior round influences the common component more.
In Figure 1.5, I plot the simulated winner’s curse for each type of project for round 1 and
29Table 1.13(a) and Table 1.13(b) report the summary of statistics of estimated means and variances for cost
distributions in both methods for both rounds, which is similar to Table 1.9 which is for reserve price distribution.
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after round 2 under flexible variance case. As expected, the winner’s curse increases as the projects
become larger. The winner’s curse is severer in round 1 across all types of projects, and the bidders
tend to suffer more from winner’s curse when participating in bridge or road types of projects
compared with the other two types in both round 1 and after round 1. All findings are consistent
with the ones with fixed variance as shown in Figure 1.2. To sum up, the winners curse effect is
larger in round 1 for all types of projects.
1.8 Conterfactual studies
After estimating the reserve price and cost distribution, I can run conterfactual studies to
answer the following policy related question: which is the best selling mechanism in terms of the
government expenditure and the probability of not selling, procurement auctions with public, secret
or no reserve prices?
I first compare public and secret reserve price. To run a counterfactual analysis for this













, if t < ρ0. (1.15)
With the estimated reserve price distribution, a reserve price is drawn from G(·) given observed
auction level characteristics. With the estimates of cost distribution in round 1, costs for all bidders
can be drawn. All bidders enter in a secret reserve price case. In contrast, bidders make their entry
decisions based on cost draws and reserve prices in a public reserve price scenario. Simulated bids
are calculated based on bidders’ cost draws. In both case, an auction goes into round 2 if no bids are
lower than the reserve price. In this situation, the same set of bidders as in round 1 will receive new
cost draws in round 2, and things stay the same in a public reserve price case. For secret reserve
price cases, bidders with cost draws higher than the lowest bid in the last round drop out, and
remaining bidders submit bids. In order to simplify the simulation procedure, an auction would be
counted as no sale if it had not been sold after round 2.30 Both fixed and flexible variance estimates
are applied to get conterfactual results (see details in Table 1.14), and standard errors are calculated
via repeating the simulation procedure 100 times. Compared with a public reserve price, both a
30This is consistent with the real world data. Less than 3% of auctions go into round 3 based on Table 3.
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government’s expenditure and probability of no sales are lower with a secret reserve price.
Bidders learn information, i.e., reserve prices before an auction starts with public reserve
prices. Hence, the winner’s curse may be less severe in round 1 compared with secret reserve prices
case. In real world, auctions rarely enter the second round with public reserve prices. With secret
reserve prices, although the probability of no sale is higher in round 1, bidders can learn more infor-
mation after round 1. This additional information helps bidders formulate a better understanding
of their costs. Thus, the winner’s curse is cured; and using secret reserve prices generates a lower
government expenditure and a lower probability of no sale.
I next compare secret and no reserve price. I need the equilibrium bid function with no













In this case in round 1, there are no entry problems under both scenarios anyway. With estimates
of cost distribution in round 1, costs for all bidders can be drawn, and bids are submitted based on
cost draws. In this case, the bidder with the lowest bid always wins with no reserve prices. With
secret reserve prices, an auction would go into round 2 if no bids are lower than the reserve price. All
bidders get new cost draws in round 2. Bidders with cost draws higher than lowest bid in the last
round drop out and the remaining participants submit bids (again, bidders do not observe the set
of dropouts until an auction ends). In order to be consistent with the sample, an auction would be
counted as a no sale if it has not been sold after round 2. Both fixed and flexible variance estimates
are applied to get conterfactual results (see details in Table 1.14). Compared with a no reserve price
case, a government’s expenditure is much lower while the probability of no sales is slightly higher
using a secret reserve price.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I study multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices under
a common value assumption. I provide evidence for the existence of a common value component
and the winner’s curse in highway procurement auctions with reduced form analysis and structural
estimation, and I also found that information released on bids from prior rounds can help cure the
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winner’s curse. With estimations of reserve prices and cost distributions, I run conterfactual analysis
and find that secret reserve prices outperforms public reserve prices in terms of a government’s
expenditure and probability of no sales.
In this paper, all bidders are assumed to be myopic, so the main source of overbidding in
round 1 is the winner’s curse rather than the forward looking effects as in [Wu, 2015]. One interesting
extension could be separating those two effects and investigating how results in this paper change if
bidders are forward looking.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Statistics
# of auctions has one round 4711
# of auctions has more than one round 929
Variable Description NOBS mean std deviation min max
Auction characteristics
DBE DBE percentage goal 4711 3.43 3.82 0 15
Time working days needed 4711 200.96 172.96 5 1958
Np number of projects 4711 1.43 1.34 1 35
Price cotract book Price 4711 21.21 25.13 12.5 537
Price
R reserve price 4711 1919490 5250780 8113.20 9.87e+07
bid1 bid for auction in 1 round 14370 1615456 4292052 950 1.25e+08
b1 bid in round 1 for auction in multi-round 3654 1934242 5145174 3550 9.89e+07
b2 bid after round 1 for auction in multi-round 2166 1758366 4687026 3287.36 9.81e+07
Number of bidder
N1 number of bidders in round 1 4711 3.82 2.02 1 14
N2 number of bidders after round 1 1094 1.98 0.96 1 7
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Table 1.2: Study for reserve prices31
With fixed effects With interactions
log(R) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
n −0.0271 0.0226 −0.0312 0.0212
r −0.1168 0.0812 −0.1747 0.1168
n×r −0.0183 0.0265 −0.0077 0.0251
DBE 0.0413∗∗∗ 0.0028 −0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0185
Time 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0002
Np 0.1104∗∗∗ 0.0116 0.1189∗∗∗ 0.0168
Price 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.1426∗∗∗ 0.0078
# of Obv 4711 4711
Adjusted R2 0.6376 0.6683
31∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ means significant at 1%, 5%,10%, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Study for the number of bidders32
Truncated NB Truncated Poisson
n Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
DBE 0.0100 0.0071 0.0100 0.0071
Time 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Np −0.0122 0.0083 −0.0123 0.0087
Price −0.0003 0.0004 −0.0003 0.0004
# of Obv 4828 4828
Log likelihood -9229.6428 -9229.6609
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Table 1.4: Pooled regression for bids with bid information from the prior round (Auction level fixed
effects)33
Without bidder info. With bidder info.
log(bid) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
n 0.0128∗∗ 0.0064 0.0123∗ 0.0064
r 0.1286∗∗ 0.0638 0.1286∗∗ 0.0634
n×r −0.0159∗ 0.0086 −0.0158∗ 0.0086
min(log(bid)) 0.3543∗∗∗ 0.1228 0.3879∗∗∗ 0.1225
max(log(bid)) −0.1631∗∗ 0.0780 −0.1494∗∗ 0.0671
mean(log(bid)) −0.1916 0.1839 −0.2389 0.1827
std(log(bid)) −0.0349∗∗ 0.0155 −0.0376∗∗ 0.0167
skew(log(bid)) −0.0267 0.0207 −0.0256 0.0206
kurt(log(bid)) 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0148 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0147
# wins −0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0001
# bids 0.0001∗∗ 2.1e−5
backlog 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0011
# of Obv 20190 20190
Adjusted R2 0.971 0.973
33For round 1, there is no information on reserve price nor previous round bids, so there should not be an upper
bound for submitted bids. Hence, it is “natural” to set variable min, max and mean to∞. Since the first order central
moment is ∞, the second, third and fourth order central moments are set to ∞ consequently. Here, I pick a value
way larger than the maximum bid of the sample. It turns out that the regression result is quite robust with varying
representation of ∞. I have also try to give min, max and mean a representation of ∞, and set others as 0, namely
all bidders know that min is same as max and it is a large but bounded. The key results still hold. One reason for
that is the different ways of representing the statistics in round 1 are absorbed largely by the round dummy. The
Hausman test indicates that we should use fixed effect model instead of random effect, which is intuitive; since here
we are using a full sample in these years instead of a random subsample. Simple F test indicates that fixed effects
model outperform simple linear model.
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Table 1.5: Pooled regression for bids with project type level fixed effects
With project type fixed effects With bidder Info.
log(bid) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
n 0.0072 0.0047 0.0097∗ 0.0054
r 0.1227∗∗ 0.0625 0.4251∗∗∗ 0.1162
n×r −0.0088∗ 0.0051 −0.0198∗∗ 0.0093
DBE 0.1145∗∗∗ 0.0021 0.0988∗∗∗ 0.0022
Time 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0001
Np 0.0627∗∗∗ 0.0058 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0057
Price 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0004
min(log(bid)) 0.5589∗∗∗ 0.1833 0.3945∗∗∗ 0.1485
max(log(bid)) −0.4805 0.3388 −0.3283∗ 0.1964
mean(log(bid)) −0.5372∗∗ 0.2725 −0.3203 0.5261
std(log(bid)) −0.4338∗∗∗ 0.0353 −0.3760∗∗∗ 0.0349
skew(log(bid)) −0.0994∗ 0.0603 −0.0616 0.0592
kurt(log(bid)) 0.0650∗∗ 0.0330 0.0152 0.0325
# wins −0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0002
# bids 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001
backlog 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.0030
# of Obv 20190 20190
Adjusted R2 0.5992 0.6228
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Table 1.6: Study for probability of auctions proceeding into round 2





# of Obv 4711
Log likelihood −1894.7966
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Table 1.7: MLE of g(·), fixed σ case











Table 1.8: MLE of g(·), flexible σ case
variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
γµ γσ
DBE 0.5914∗∗∗ 0.0327 0.0003∗∗∗ 5.0e−5
Time −0.3394∗∗∗ 0.0043 −0.0037∗∗ 0.0018
Np 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0095 3.2e−5∗ 1.8e−5
Price 0.0031∗∗ 0.0015 −1.9e−5∗ 1.1e−5
Bridge 1.2202∗∗∗ 0.0252 0.0476∗∗∗ 0.0129
Road 3.7901∗∗∗ 0.0379 0.0101 0.0172
Maintenance 0.4610∗∗∗ 0.0119 0.0004 0.0003
cons 12.0146∗∗∗ 0.1208 0.3572∗∗∗ 0.0109
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Table 1.9: Summary of Statistics of mean and variance of g(·)
Variable mean std deviation skewness kurtosis 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Fixed σ
µ 14.8037 1.0888 1.3622 9.2778 13.2844 13.8984 14.8317 15.3536 18.3515
σ 1.4274
flexible σ
µ 13.3412 2.4261 1.2649 9.0030 8.8533 11.9124 12.8393 14.6691 20.0837
σ 1.4318 0.0256 0.4455 3.6192 1.3777 1.4174 1.4295 1.4430 1.4982
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Table 1.10: MSM Estimates of fj(·)34
Round 1 After Round 1
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
DBE 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0059 0.0020∗ 0.0011
Time 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0002 −6.7e−5∗∗ 3.2e−5
Np 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0024 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0064







Bridge 0.7527∗∗∗ 0.1031 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0055
Road 0.9386∗∗∗ 0.1608 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0036
Maintenance 0.1237∗∗∗ 0.0327 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0003
cons 10.1688∗∗∗ 0.0199 −0.1547∗∗∗ 0.0146
σv 1.6185
∗∗∗ 0.0127 0.9123∗∗∗ 0.1949
σa 0.5299
∗∗∗ 0.0102 1.3912∗∗∗ 0.2251
σe 0.6421
∗∗∗ 0.0072 0.2710∗∗ 0.1319
34In the structural work, any moments used in estimating cost in round j > 1 are well defined, due to assumption
3 and identification requirement that Nj ≥ 2.
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Table 1.11: MSM Estimates of f1(·) with flexible variances
θµ θσv θσa θσe
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
DBE 0.0520∗∗∗ 0.0032 −0.0018∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗∗ 0.0001
Time 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0004 −1.2e−5 1.8e−5 1.1e−5 1.7e−5 1.2e−5 0.9e−5
Np 0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0127 −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0005∗ 0.0003 −0.0019∗ 0.0011
Price 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0021 0.0001∗ 5.8e−5 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0001
Bridge 0.6172∗∗∗ 0.0621 0.0027∗∗ 0.0012 −0.0103∗∗ 0.0047 0.0031∗ 0.0016
Road 0.8782∗∗∗ 0.0672 0.0043∗ 0.0025 −0.0059∗ 0.0031 0.0065∗∗ 0.0032
Maintenance 0.1379∗∗∗ 0.0279 0.0022∗ 0.0013 −0.0036∗ 0.0019 0.0005∗∗ 0.0002
cons 10.4107∗∗∗ 0.9281 0.4820∗∗∗ 0.0294 −0.6295∗∗∗ 0.0397 −0.4474∗∗∗ 0.0271
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Table 1.12: MSM Estimates of f2(·) with flexible variances
θµ θσv θσa θσe
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
DBE 0.0031∗ 0.0018 0.0066∗∗ 0.0029 0.0015∗ 0.0008 −0.0021∗ 0.0012
Time −8.1e−5 5.7e−5 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0020∗ 0.0012 0.0013∗ 0.0007
Np 0.0110∗ 0.0065 1.6e−5 0.0001 −0.0003∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0002∗ 0.0001
Price −0.0002 0.0002 2.3e−5 3.5e−5 2.2e−5 2.5e−5 −0.9e−5 3.2e−5
Bridge 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0049 0.0244∗ 0.0146 −0.0065∗∗ 0.0029 0.0066 0.0042
Road 0.0182∗∗ 0.0072 0.0349∗∗ 0.0157 −0.0085∗∗ 0.0041 −0.0025 0.0021
Maintenance 0.0007∗∗ 0.0003 0.0107 0.0167 −0.0044 0.0031 −0.0023 0.0017
min(log(bid)) −0.1007 0.1972 0.0799∗ 0.0411 0.0511∗ 0.0271 0.0431 0.0391
max(log(bid)) 0.2261∗ 0.1191 0.0770∗∗ 0.0271 0.0875 0.0581 0.0685∗ 0.0371
mean(log(bid)) 0.8279∗∗ 0.3781 −0.0968∗ 0.0741 −0.1315∗∗ 0.0591 −0.1051 0.0927
std(log(bid)) −0.9711∗∗∗ 0.3026 −0.0029∗ 0.0017 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001
skew(log(bid)) −0.0137 0.0125 0.0056 0.0061 −0.0003 0.0002 0.0082 0.0102
kurt(log(bid)) 0.0192 0.0271 −0.0175 0.0172 −0.0106 0.0291 −0.0044∗ 0.0024
cons −0.1209∗ 0.0631 0.1129∗∗∗ 0.0292 −0.3728∗∗∗ 0.0512 −0.8801∗∗∗ 0.273
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Table 1.13: Summary of Statistics of mean and variance of fj(·)
Variable mean std deviation skewness kurtosis 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Panel (a): j = 1
Fixed σ





µ 12.4175 0.6258 1.0122 6.0700 11.4778 11.9508 12.2868 12.8882 14.1631
σv 1.6194 0.0207 −2.1522 19.4050 1.5694 1.6070 1.6205 1.6328 1.6373
σa 0.5272 0.0118 1.3245 5.9210 0.5002 0.5263 0.5270 0.5301 0.5353
σx 0.6312 0.0128 −2.0425 18.3303 0.6279 0.6301 0.6316 0.6357 0.6455
Panel (b): j = 2
Fixed σ j = 2





µ 11.7829 1.5682 0.1390 2.8924 9.5446 10.8694 11.7795 12.5514 15.6909
σv 0.9086 0.0176 0.2280 3.4568 0.8660 0.8931 0.9107 0.9196 0.9594
σa 1.3821 0.0206 −0.0492 5.3189 1.3402 1.3679 1.3794 1.3920 1.4267
σx 0.2724 0.0039 −0.4660 4.0642 0.2616 0.2699 0.2730 0.2751 0.2795
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Table 1.14: Counterfactual analysis
diff in government expenditure std.Err. diff in prob of no sale std.Err.
Question 1 Public-secret
fixed σ 81610∗∗ 41017 0.0331∗ 0.0202
flexible σ 66350∗∗ 33092 0.0285∗ 0.0164
Question 2 No-secret
fixed σ 197926∗∗∗ 79012 −0.0301∗ 0.0172
flexible σ 157230∗ 71090 −0.0373∗ 0.0207
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Figure 1.3: Simulated equilibrium bidding function with flexible σ in round 1
(a) Bridge type project. (b) Road type project.
(c) Maintain type project. (d) Traffic type project.
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Figure 1.4: Simulated equilibrium bidding function with flexible σ in round 2
(a) Bridge type project. (b) Road type project.
(c) Maintain type project. (d) Traffic type project.
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Figure 1.5: Simulated winner’s curse with flexible σ
(a) Bridge type project in round 1. (b) Bridge type project in round 2. (c) Road type project in round 1. (d) Road type project in round 2.
(e) Maintain type project in round 1. (f) Maintain type project in round 2. (g) Trafic type project in round 1. (h) Trafic type project in round 2.
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Chapter 2
Estimation of Dynamic Auction
Games: Multi-round Procurement
Auction with Secret Reserve Price
2.1 Introduction.
While reserve price policies are known to significantly impact auction behavior and perfor-
mance, there is surprisingly little consensus across U.S. state transportation departments regard-
ing the optimal procurement design. Although engineers’ cost estimates (ECE) are typically used
for determining reserve prices, when they are announced and how they are used varies greatly.
[De Silva et al., 2008] pointed out that across the 50 states in the United States, there are seven
different policies on engineers’ cost estimates (ECE) information release. Governments use ECE of
projects as reserve prices for the auctions. The most commonly used ECE policy is to only release
ECE after the bidding has taken place, and this policy is the same as using secret reserve prices. Fif-
teen states are currently using this policy. There are eight other states that release ECE information
prior to the auction taking place, and this policy is the same as using public reserve prices. Eight
other states do not release the ECE before or after the bid letting. Although every state claims that
one type of ECE policy is used, any states could apply a no reserve price policy if the winning bid
is always higher than the ECE.
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One interesting question is how the way of release of ECE affects auction performance? Using
a policy change in Oklahoma (switch from secret to public reserve price), [De Silva et al., 2008] argue
that adopting public reserve price reduces the government expenditure with a difference in difference
analysis. Things happen in the other way around too. For instance, Illinois switched from using
public to secret reserve price. This paper answers the same question with counterfactual analysis, i.e.,
I first estimate bidder’s the cost structurally, and then simulate and compare government expenditure
under different reserve price policies.
Auctions with secret reserve prices become multi-round auctions because the auction con-
tinues to an additional round whenever the lowest bid received is higher than the reserve price.
Compared with single round auctions, multi-round auctions have drawn less attentions from re-
searchers. [Ji and Li, 2008] derived the theoretical model under the assumption of independent
private value and risk neutral myopic bidders. However, bidders may not always be risk neutral.1 I
relax the risk neutral assumption and derive the theoretical model allowing bidders being risk averse.
I then estimate the model and detecte risk aversion of bidders.
In multi-round auctions, bidders may not be myopic either. If bidders aware that chance
that auctions go into round 2 is high, they can be forward looking on their participation or bid
decisions. With secret reserve price, a myopic bidder enters even though he gets a “bad” cost
draw in round 1. This is not true for a forward looking bidder.2 With the possibility of winning
in round 2, bidders can bid less aggressively in round 1. There are not much existing literature on
dynamic auction games, and the pioneer work is [Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003]. They estimate
a dynamic auction game without entry focusing on across auction dynamic (capacity constraints).
I model both within and across auction dynamic (multi-round effect and capacity effect). Besides,
bidders can forward looking in both of participation and bid decision, so I model the dynamic entry
too.3
After estimating both models with myopic and forward looking bidders, I conducted a
series of counterfactual studies to address the following questions, which one of the following is the
best selling mechanism, auctions with public reserve prices, no reserve price or some other format?
By simulation, (I) compared with public reserve prices, with myopic bidders, secret reserve prices
1For a static game, [Li and Tan, 2000] show that using a secret reserve price is better for the seller than public
reserve price in presence of risk aversion.
2Not enter reduces the competition effect, hence bid amount and probability of no sales increase. The expected
future utility can potentially increase much without losing too much of current utility.
3In terms of estimation, I focus on within auction dynamic and no entry.
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generate a lower government expenditure and probability of no sales; (II) for forward looking bidders
with a high discount factor (δ), public reserve prices work better, while the secret reserve prices work
better for bidders with lower δ.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents assumptions and derives equilibrium
bidding strategies. Section 3 describes the data set. In Section 4, I run reduce form analysis. In
Section 5, I estimate the structural model. Section 6 reports the results. In Section 7, I run the
counterfactual analysis. Section 8 concludes. All proofs, tables and graphs are included in the
Appendix.
2.2 Auction Model.
2.2.1 Model setup and key assumptions.
I focus on the independent private value paradigm with symmetric bidders.4 There are N
potential bidders in the game. First, I assume
Assumption 1. All bidders have the same utility function, i.e., u(w) = η(w)
1
η .
This specific functional form is chosen for two reasons. First, the risk neutral case can be nested
in this case, i.e., bidders are risk neutral if η = 1. Second, with this functional form, I can get the
analytic expression for the equilibrium bidding function.
At the beginning of the game, the seller (government) has an engineer estimates which is
secret until someone wins the auction and serves as a reserve price (r). In our model, r is randomly
draw from G(·). Second, I assume,
Assumption 2. After r is drawn, it is fixed.
Assumption 2 prevents a government from altering r once drawn.5 For instance, even though
observing more participants, the government can not reduce r since more competition can lead to
lower bids. Observing the lowest bid is higher than r, the government can not rise r to make a quick
sale either. Another key assumption is,
Assumption 3. All potential bidders submit bids in round 1.
This means there is no entry problem in round 1.6 Unlike public reserve price, one advantage
4Symmetry is dropped only in Proposition 1 and (2.3).
5Assumption 2-4 follow closely with [Ji and Li, 2008]
6Assumption 3 holds across this paper except for in Proposition 1.
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of secret reserve price is to encourage participation. Hence, bidders always enter in round 1 if capacity
constraint is ignored. Each bidder draws his cost in round 1 from distribution F1. At the end of
round 1, all bids are opened, ranked and released. If the lowest bid is lower than r, that bidder wins,
the reserve price reveals and game ends. If there is no bid lower than r, the game continuous and
proceeds into round 2. In round 2, I assume,
Assumption 4. Each bidder in auction l draws his cost cjl randomly from Fjl(·) in round j.
To have more degree of freedom, the cost distribution in each round can be differed.7 Most auctions
proceeding into round 2 are resold at least a month after round 1 (on average this number is
about 54 dates). As [Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003] pointed out, each firm can participate in
several auctions in each month, and they can both win and lose for some of them. In each round,
their capacity constraints differ, hence the opportunity costs differ. This supports our random cost
assumption to some extent. Last, I assume,
Assumption 5. The class of distribution Ψ contains F (·) and G(·) are strictly increasing, contin-
uously differentiable with continuous density f(·) and g(·) such that f, g > 0.
This is a technical assumption for identification. Many commonly used continuous distribution
satisfy this, for instance, uniform, normal, lognormal, exponential, and etc.
There is a Bayesian updating on the reserve price for the bidders, i.e., the lowest bid in
prior round becomes the upper bound for the reserve price in next round. Hence, bidders with cost
draws higher than the upper bound quit. The game ends when someone wins.
2.2.2 Myopic bidders.
I first derived the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) for myopic bidders. One advantage
of the myopic bidder assumption is that it accommodates the flexibility of allowing for changes of
bidders’ private cost distributions across rounds(I allow Fj(·) 6= F−j(·)). Let cj denote the bidder’s
cost in round j, and the associated bidding strategy bj . The equilibrium bidding function is bj = β(c)
for the symmetric case, with β′(·) > 0. s∗j is the lowest bid in round j.
7Assumption 4 holds only for the myopic bidder case. A formal test of this is conducted after the structural
estimation.
44







See all proofs for theorems in the Appendix. For j = 1 case, I have s0 = c̄, hence G(s
∗
j−1) = 1.
By the Bayesian updating of the upper bound of the reserve price, bidders will not submit
their bids above the lowest bids in previous round. Intuitively, bidders bid more aggressively over
stages, and this is stated formally in the following corollary,
Corollary 1. In our model which allows bidder being risk averse, the bj+1 ≤ bj ∀ j.
Proof is omitted since it is similar to [Ji and Li, 2008]. Same as the case when there is no reserve
price, bidders bid more aggressively when they are more risk averse. This is,
Theorem 2. ∀ j, ∂bj∂η < 0.
2.2.3 Forward looking bidders.
Bidders can be forward looking in both bidding strategies and their participation decisions.
Bidders can be forward looking in bidding, and bid higher since there is a possibility of winning in
the next round. If a bidder gets a cost draw which is lower than but close to the lowest bid in last
round, under myopic setting, he enters, and the probability that he wins is relatively low and the
expected future profit redueces due to extra competitioin. However, a forward looking bidder may
quit, since this reduces the degree of competition in this round, and leads to a higher probability
of no wins. If the auction proceeds into next round and the bidder gets a lower enough cost draw,
he may win the auction with higher profit. Hence choosing to exit in the prior round is a better
strategy.8 Under a dynamic setting, at round j, bidder i’s value function is,
Wi(ci,j , b−i,j , χ−i,j , sj−1) = max
bi,j ,χi,j





Wi(ci,j+1, b−i,j+1, χ−i,j+1, bi,j+1, χi,j+1, sj)pi(ci,j+1, sj |ci,j , sj−1)dci,j+1dsj}
in which, (I) p1 = Pr(i|bi,j , b−i,j , χi,j , χ−i,j , sj−1), i.e., probability that bidder i wins conditional on
all bidding and participation decision; (II) p2 = Pr(none|bi,j , b−i,j , χi,j , χ−i,jsj−1), i.e, probability
8The no entry assumption (Assumption 3) is dropped to apply the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium.
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that no one wins conditional on all bidding and participation decision. Bid submitted (bi,j) and
entry decision (χi,j) are the choice variables, and χ ∈ {0, 1}, χ = 1 if bidder i enters in round j, 0
otherwise. The player specific state variable is ci,j and the common state variable is sj−1. p(·, ·) is a
probability density function for state variables updating, and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor. Notice
that I allow bidders exit and then re-enter.
Since the econometrician cannot observe ci,j , sometimes it is useful to use the ex ante value
function which integrates ci,j out. Based on Assumption 6, I defined the ex ante value function




Wi(cj , b−i,j , χ−i,j , s
∗





χi,j(bi,j − ci,j)p∗1 + δp∗2E(Vi(sj |sj−1))
b∗i,j = ci,j +
1∑
j 6=i
λ(bi,j) + ν(bi,j |sj−1)
+ δE(Vi(sj |sj−1)) (2.2)
in which, (I) p∗1 = Pr(i|bi,j , b∗−i,j , χi,j , χ∗−i,j , sj−1); (II) p∗2 = Pr(none|bi,j , b∗−i,j , χi,j , χ∗−i,jsj−1). Haz-
ard rates for bid and reserve price are denoted as λ(bi,j) =
h(bi,j)




In the structural estimation, I only consider the within auction dynamic, and see reduced
form analysis section for reasons. However, it is possible to generalize the model with across auction
dynamic too (backlog effect as in [Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003]).
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i,1|S0, s2i , s2−i)dc′i,1} (2.3)
in which, (I) p1 = Pr(i|b, b−i,j , S0, s1j−1, s2i,j , s2−i,j), i.e., probability that bidder i wins; (II) p2 =
Pr(none|b, b−i,j , S0, s1j−1), i.e., probability that no one wins; (III) p3 = Pr(j|b, b−i,j , S0, s1j−1, s2i,j , s2−i,j),
9To avoid trivial MPE, i.e., all bidders enter or exit in each round, bidders can be asymmetric. Notice that
bidder’s entry decision depends on the value function with no analytic expression. In terms of estimation, the forward
simulation method introduced in [Bajari et al., 2007] can be applied if I observed entry decisions for multiple rounds.
However, I do not include auctions that have more than two rounds in this sample.
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i.e., probability that bidder j wins. In this case, I have two sets of state variables S = {s1, s2}, the
common one s1 (lowest bid in previous round) and player specific s2 including backlog and cost.
The choice variable is bid submitted. In addition, the player specific state variable can be helpful in
model identification.
In this paper, I focus on case with dynamic within auction and bidders forward looking in
bidding. In round j bidder i’s value function is,













j |cj , s∗j−1)dcj+1ds∗j} (2.4)





j |cj , s∗j−1) = f(cj+1|cj)× q(s∗j |s∗j−1) = f(cj+1)× q(s∗j |s∗j−1) (2.5)
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ηPr(i|b, s∗j−1) + δPr(none|b, s∗j−1)E(V (s∗j )|s∗j−1)}f(cj)dcj (2.6)
The MPE for the baseline case can be derived,
Theorem 3. For round j, the MPE ∀ bidder is,
b = c+
1







There are two major changes in Theorem 3 compared with Theorem 1. The cost distribution F (·)
does not vary across rounds, and there is an additional markup term. Clearly, I can not get analytic
solution of b unless η = 1. When bidders are risk neutral,
b = c+
1
(N − 1)λ(b) + ν(b|s∗j−1)
+ δE(V (s∗j |s∗j−1)) (2.8)
Compared with the myopic equilibrium bidding function, the bidder bids weakly higher given same
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cost/bid draw if he is forward looking, due the additional non-negative markup term.
2.3 Data.
This paper analyzes a data set of auctions held by the INDOT. The auctions are first-price,
sealed-bid auctions, while reserve prices are unknown to bidders before auctions are sold. An auction
proceeds as follows. The INDOT posts the notice to contractors to invite bids five weeks prior to the
bidding day. On the bidding day, each bidder submits a sealed bid knowing that the government has
a secret reserve price. Finally, the received bids are unsealed and ranked by the government publicly.
If the lowest bid in the auction is lower than the reserve price, the contract is then awarded to that
bidder. Otherwise the contract will be re-advertised and re-auctioned. The sample used in this
paper includes bridge rehabilitation and replacement auctions from September 1999 to June 2013.
These types of auctions are chosen since there exists large heterogeneity across auctions, yet the
characteristics of these types of bridge works are relatively more observable to the econometricians.
To avoid the complexity of entry and be consistent with no entry assumption (Assumption
3), for auctions that proceeds into round 2, I only include those in which the bidders in round 2 is a
weakly subset of the bidders in round 1. The data set consists of 899 lets with 4,759 bids. Table 2.1
and Table 2.2 give the description of the variables and the summary statistics. For each auctioned
contract, I have the following observations: all bids with the bidders’ identities and auction level
characteristics, including ex post released reserve price, number of bidders, number of projects,
length of bridges, the letting date, the completion date, the DBE goal and the structure of the
bridge.10 Unlike [Ji and Li, 2008], I also have information on bidders identities, which allow me to
construct some measures of backlogs and the bidder’s experience, for instance, number of wins and
number of submitted bids. However, there exists measurement error for the experience measurement,
since there are left truncated, i.e., there is no information on auctions of INDOT before year 1999
available online. Besides, I can only get the backlog measure of these two types of projects.
105% DBE means that, if a non DBE firm wins the auction, it has to hire some DBE firms and at least 5% of the
money from government has to be transferred to the DBE firm. See details in [Ji and Li, 2008]
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2.4 Reduced form analysis.
To show some concrete evidence for fix reserve prices assumption (Assumption 2), I regress
logarithm of the reserve price on a set of covariates, i.e., number of bidders, round 2 dummy, dummy
for bridge rehabilitation, all the observed auction characteristics, and interaction terms between
dummy variable for bridge rehabilitation and all observed auction characteristics. From results
in Table 2.3, I find that neither the number of bidders nor the round-two dummy has significant
impact on reserve prices, which provides support for Assumption 2. Besides, all observed auction
characteristics except for DBE have positive and significant direct effect on reserve price on average,
and on average the reserve price is higher for bridge replacement projects compared with bridge
rehabilitation projects.11
To give some support to no entry assumption (Assumption 3), I estimated a zero truncated
negative binomial model, and treat number of bidders as a count variable (I do not have auctions
with no participation). Results in Table 2.4 show that most observed auction characteristics have
neither significant direct nor indirect effect in explaining number of bidders. Thus, number of actual
bidders can be considered the same as the number of bidders within a certain type of bridge projects.
However, I observe that on average there are more bidders in bridge replacement projects compared
with bridge rehabilitation projects.
There are two empirically testable implications about the equilibrium bids from the theo-
retical model. First, it can be easily verified that the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies given
by (1) is decreasing with the number of bidders since more competition drives bidders to bid more
aggressively. Second, the theoretical model predicts that the equilibrium bids are lower in round 2,
which is stated in Corollary 1.
To show some evidence to these implications, I regress logarithm of bids on a set of covariates,
i.e. the number of bidders and the round 2 dummy, dummy for bridge rehabilitation, observed
bidder and auction level characteristics, and interaction between bridge rehabilitation dummy and
other variables (see results in Table 2.5). For case of no bidder level characteristics, the coefficient
of number of bidders is strongly significant and negatively, which indicates that holding all other
covariates constant, the expected bid goes down as more bidders enter. The coefficient of round 2
11The coefficients of most interaction terms between dummy variable for bridge rehabilitation and observed auction
characteristics are statistically significant, and the adjusted R2 increases from 0.4386 to 0.5358 after I add in interaction
terms, which indicates that the interaction terms should be included in the single index model in the structural
estimation to capture all the indirect effect from dummy variable for rehabilitation project on reserve prices.
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dummy is also negative and strongly significant, which means that on average, the bid is smaller
in round 2 holding other things constant. These findings support the theory. Besides, all observed
auction characteristics except for DBE have positive and significant direct and indirect effect on bids
on average.12 The adjusted R2 of the pooled regression is about 0.52, and this indicates that there




Reserve price for auction l and bidder’s cost in round j auction l have the following densities,













in which, xl is the observed characteristics for auction l. I include µ ∼ N(0, σ2) as the unobserved
auction level heterogeneity due to the argument in Section 4.
Corollary 2. Given the cost distribution, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in round









































in which η measures the degree of risk aversion, and s∗1 denotes the lowest bid in round 1. Proof is
omitted since it is similar to [Ji and Li, 2008].
I use simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the parameter of the reserve price distri-
bution, and use simulated method of moment to estimate the parameter in cost distribution. In
12When I include all the bidder level characteristics, the adjusted R2 decreases from 51.85% to 51.29%, which
suggests that I can drop those bidder level information for the structure estimation.
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particular, the related moments are,






E(b2il|c ≤ s∗1, Nl, gl(·), xl, µl) = m2(b2il, s∗1, xl, µl, γ, σ; θ2)
in which, bjil denotes the ith bid in auction l in round j, and Nl denotes number of bidders in
auction l. For the purpose of estimation, I integrate µl out and get the following,










E(b1il|Nl, gl(·), xl, ) = M1(b1il, xl, γ, σ; θ1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
m1(b1il, xl, µl, γ, σ; θ1)w(ul|σ)dµl
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gl(r|xl, γ, µsl )w(ul|σ)
φ(µsl )
) (2.12)
in which L denotes the number of auctions, and φ(·) denotes the density function of standard normal
















(bjil −mj(bjil, xl, µl, γ, σ; θj))), and Ω is the K ×K identity matrix,
and K = length(θj). Lj denotes the number of auction in round j, and Nl denotes number of bids
in auction l. Before showing results, I list the following identification result,
Corollary 3. Given Assumption 5, (θj , η) is identified uniquely, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof is omitted since it is closely related to Theorem 1 in [Donald and Paarsch, 1996].
2.5.2 Forward looking bidders.
In this part, I make the risk neutral assumption to simplify the analysis (see details in
Section 3). The reserve price distribution is same as before. Instead of the cost distribution, I
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assume that the bid for auction l has density hl(·),






This can be estimated by the simulated maximum likelihood method I introduced in the last part.
I can get the cost via the following,
c = b− 1
(N − 1)λ(b) + ν(b|s∗j−1)
− δE(V (s∗j |s∗j−1)) (2.15)
b is observable from data, and after I estimate g(·) and h(·), λ(b), ν(b|s∗j−1) are known. Also the
transition probability q(s∗j |s∗j−1) is given by the following proposition,















The result is intuitive, since Q is just the probability that no one wins in round j (the reserve price
is lower than any of the bids in round j) given that no one won in round j − 1 (the reserve price in
round j − 1 was lower than all the bids in round j − 1).
Since δ is not jointly identified with θ, hence I need to assign value to it. The only task
is to estimate the value function. Fixing η = 1, and plugging (2.7) into (2.6), changing the cost










(Pr(none|b, s∗j−1) + Pr(i|b, s∗j−1))h(b)db× E(V (s∗j )|s∗j−1) (2.17)
the first part is the bidder’s current expected utility, and the second part is the bidders discounted












(N − 1)λ(bi) + ν(bi|s∗j−1)
(2.18)
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in which bi’s are drawn from H(b|s∗j−1). By doing this, I assume that all N bidders that entered
satisfy the entry rule (s∗j−1 > bj), which is kind of strong. However, since I do not observation the
pattern of number of bidders after round 2, hence, I have to make this assumption if I want the
value function converges to the fix point. The probability in the second term of the value function



















according to Lemma 1 in Appendix. M(·) is the distribution function of the smallest order statistic







in which νi’s are drawn from G(·|s∗j−1). By the method introduced in [Judd, 1998], I can now
iteratively solve for value functions. Starting with s0, and I can obtain V1(s0), PV (s0) and q(s1|s0),
so I can get s1, hence I can get V (s0). With s1, I can again calculate V1(s1), PV (s1), q(s2|s1)
and I will plug those pieces of new information into the value function. I stop iterating when the
value function approaches to its fixed point. Following [Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003], the cost




The parameters of the reserve price distribution (γ) and the unobserved heterogeneity (σ)
can be jointly estimated. For each auction l, I draw µl 1, 000 times from N(0, 1), and adopt im-
portance sampling to implement the SML.13 The results are reported in Table 2.6. Signs of all
13The initial guess of parameters is the coefficients from the reduced form analysis from Table 2.3. Base on that
I construct a grid with 50 sets of different initial guesses. Parallel computing on Palmetto cluster are applied here
53
coefficients are positive except for dummy variable for bridge rehabilitation, and all direct effects
are statistically significant. This indicates that the more complex a project is, the higher the mean
of the reserve price distribution is, holding other things constant.
Next I estimate parameters in private cost distributions (θj for j = 1, 2). In round 1, an
explicit expression for the moment condition exists. Hence, as in SML, I need to draw µl 100
times for each auction l from N(0, σ̂) and calculate integral numerically. Here, I only draw µl 100
times instead of 1, 000, since an MSM estimator is consistent for any fixed number of simulations
as in [Gourieroux and Monfort, 1996]. Things became more complicated in round 2 since there is
no analytic solution for the bidding function. In the inner loop, for a group of random draw of c’s
associated with each trial of θ2’s, I can solve the differential equation numerically with initial value
s∗1, and then calculate the integral numerically. In the outer loop, I search the θ2 that minimizes
the objective function (2.13). As in SML, various sets of initial guesses are constructed. Results of
the estimation for both rounds are reported in Table 2.7. Notice here, all the signs of coefficients
of the observed auction level characteristics are positive expect for dummy for rehabilitation, and
all direct effects are statistically significant. This indicates that the more complex a project is, the
higher the mean of the cost distribution is.
I can infer that η = 1 is rejected at 5% level of significance. For mean level of auction
characteristics and number of bidders, I calculate bids difference between two bidders (risk neutral
versus risk averse) given that the cost draws are the same. For an auction with mean level of
characteristics, on average risk averse bidders bid $4,105.2 ($8,692.5) less than a risk neutral bidder
in a bridge rehabilitation (replacement) project. Hence, I should not simply assume risk neutrality.
The degree of risk aversion decreases as rounds proceed.
I use Wald test for structure changes to show whether cost distributions change across
rounds. If not, in the counterfactual study, I can draw costs from estimates of round 1 for both
rounds. This can give more accurate results since estimates in round 2 is less accurate due to the
small sample. The Wald test for structure changes introduced by [Andrews and Fair, 1988] has the
following form, W = (θ̂1− θ̂2)′( 1L1
̂V ar(θ1)+ 1L2
̂V ar(θ2))−1(θ̂1− θ̂2), in which, Lj denotes the number
of auctions in round j. The test statistic is 0.1202. Thus, θ1 = θ2 can not be rejected at 5% level of
to save computational time. To deal with the hard bound of 72 hours limits for one job, each of the minimization
routine is done iteratively to guarantee that I got a locally minimization given an initial guess, in each iteration the
maximum of function evaluation and maximum of iterations are set to 2000. In each new iteration, I use the results
in previous one as the initial guess. For all 50 guesses, iterations stop after a fix point is approached. To get a global




2.6.2 Forward looking bidders.
Estimates of the reserve price distribution are the same as in Table 2.6. The bid distribution
is estimated by SML, and the result is reported in Table 2.8. Most of the signs are same as the
ones for cost distribution, and this is consistent with the fact that the equilibrium bidding function
increases with cost. All the coefficients for the observed auction level characteristics are positive
expect for the dummy for rehabilitation.
Now I can solve out the value function for each auction. I fix the auction characteristics at
the mean level of auction characteristics for both types of projects, and set δ = 0.95 and δ = 0.35.
Number of potential bidders is set as 5. The value function for a representative bidder in both types
of projects with different discount factor is reported in Figure 2.1 (the left/right one is for bridge
rehabilitation/replacement). The value function for both types of projects with same discount factor
is reported in Figure 2.2 (the left/right one is for high/low δ). The value function is increasing in
the state variable and concave. As the lowest bid in last round increases, the markup of bid goes up
too. Since if the lowest bid in last round is very low and you bid with a high markup, the probability
of winning is low since all bidders will bid low. The concavity is necessary to approach a fix point
for the dynamic system. For the same project, the value function is always smaller with a low δ,
i.e., if your valuation for the future is small, then your value function is smaller. Value functions for
the bridge replacement projects are always greater since projects are usually more costly.
With estimates of value function and δ’s, at the mean level auction characteristics, I can
now simulate the bid as a function of cost. The bid function of a representative bridge rehabilita-
tion(replacement) project is reported in Figure 2.3(2.4). The left/right panel of Figure 2.3 and 2.4 is
for δ = 0.95/δ = 0.35. Notice that bid is strictly increasing with cost, parallels to the 45◦ line, and
the gap between the two is caused by the two markup terms. The linearity of the bidding function
in cost is due to the random cost assumption (Assumption 4) and the distributional assumption
for reserve price and cost (exponential). Bids are smaller with smaller δ, i.e., the more impatient a
bidder is, the lower bid he submits now, since he cares more about now than future. Markups for
different types of projects are not differed much.
By (2.15), the cost distribution for both types of projects are derived and reported in Figure
2.5 under δ = 0.35 and δ = 0.95, in which, the left/right one is for bridge rehabilitation/replacement
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projects. In both cases, for a fixed level of bid, the inferred cost is smaller with larger discount
factor. Bidders care more about future when δ is large, to bid the same as bidders with a smaller δ,
the cost drawn must be lower for them. The cost is in general larger for bridge replacement projects.
2.7 Counterfactual studies.
I compare various reserve price policy with secret reserve price, i.e., (I) public reserve price,
(II) no reserve price, and (III) a non ex post release secret reserve price. I answer all 3 questions for
myopic bidders, but only the first two for forward looking bidders.
2.7.1 Myopic bidders.
To compare public with secret reverse price, I need the equilibrium bid function for a risk






, if c < ρ0 (2.21)




, if c < ρ0 (2.22)
In round 1, I first draw the unobserved heterogeneity µ from N(0, σ̂) for each auction. With µ and
estimates of γ, I can draw the reserve price from g.
There are two ways to run counterfactual analysis. In method 1, bidders only observe the
set of potential bidders(same under public or secret scenario). All potential bidders for auction l
draw cost from fl, if the cost draw is already higher than reserve price, then the bidder quits under
public scenario, in contrast, all bidders enter for secret case. With the number of potential bidders,
I can calculate the equilibrium bids by (2.22) and (2.10), and the minimum one lower than reserve
price is the winning bid. If no one wins, then the auction goes into round 2.14 In round 2, all
potential bidders re-enter, I redraw the cost from cost distribution in round 1 for each bidder.15 For
14Under public reserve price, the auction goes into round 2 if all bidders’ cost draws are higher than reserve price,
or all bidders’ markups are high and the submitted bids are higher than reserve price.
15I do this for two reasons, (I) by the Wald test, I can not reject the cost distributions are the same across stages;
(II) estimates for round 1 is more accurate due to the larger sample size and less numerical procedure.
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public scenario, everything stays the same. For the secret case, although the reserve price has not
been released yet, a bidder exits if his cost is higher than the lowest bid in last round. he equilibrium
bids are calculated numerically by (2.11). I restrict my simulation in two rounds. An auction is
counted as no sale if not sold after round 2, and I take the winning bid as government expenditure.16
See results in Table 2.10 (standard errors are calculated by repeating the previous procedure for 100
times). It is clearly that the secret reserve price reduces the government expenditure by $68,479 and
the probability of no sales by about 1%, but in both cases standard errors are large.
One drawback of method 1 is that the number of potential bidders may differs under different
reserve price types. This can be solved partly method 2. In method 2, I assume that the bidders
observe the set of actual bidders, i.e., bidders know the set of bidders who quit due to bad cost draws.
With the same procedure as in method 1, I find that the secret reserve price reduced the government
expenditure significantly by $115,820 and the probability of no sales by 3%, and standard error
reduces too. The change of results is mainly due to the extra competition effects in secret reserve
prices(encourage participation). The drawback of method 2 is that in prior of submitting their own
bids, bidders knows exactly that how many of the potential bidders drop out. To sum up, secret
reserve price outperforms public reserve price in terms of generating a lower government expenditure
and probability of no sale. This may explain that why secret reserve price is the most popular policy
across Departments of Transportation.
To compare no and secret reserve price, I need the equilibrium bid function for a risk averse












Notice that he main difference between (2.23) and (2.21) is that bidder always enter in when there
is no reserve price, however, under public reserve price, bidder only enter if c < ρ0. Since there is no
reserve price, the lowest bid always wins, so the game never goes into round 2. In this case, under
16The discount factor for the government is assumed to be 1. In most cases, these two types of projects are not
that urgent, since INDOT is forward looking and replace/repair earlier then really need. Besides most re-auction
happened after one month, hence, setting the discount factor in 1 is reasonable.
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the secret setting, everything stays the same as in previous cases. Under no reserve price setting,
the cost is draw from the same distribution as in previous case, and the equilibrium bids can be
calculated by (2.24), and the lowest bid wins the auction. See Table 2.10 for results.
With method 1, the government expenditure is $109,361 less with secret reserve price, but
the probability of no sale is 3% higher, and both of them are statistically significant. With method
2, the government expenditure is $173,728 less with secret reserve price, but the probability of no
sale is 1% higher. In both two methods, secret reserve price outperforms no reserve price in terms
of government expenditure but not in terms of probability of no sales. In real world, quite a few
states have no reserve price, and this may indicate that they care about the issue of no sales (or
quick sales) more than expenditure.
In case (III), I do not observe reserve price ex post. The only information I have is that
the reserve price is weakly greater than the winning bid if the auction finishes in one round. If
the auction goes into round 2, the reserve price is weakly greater than the winning bid and strictly
















ω(µl|σ)(1−G(bw,1|xl2 , µl, γ, σ))dµl)} (2.25)
in which, l1 denotes all auctions sold in first round, l2 denotes all auctions sold in second round. For
j ∈ {1, 2}, bw,j denotes the winning bid in round j. This is a consistent estimator of true reserve price
distribution by similar argument as in interval regression. See estimates in Table 2.9. As presented
in Figure 2.6, the mean of the reserve price distribution is underestimated due to the limited sample
size and too many right censoring. Hence, results counterfactual study may not be reliable.
2.7.2 Forward looking bidders.
To my knowledge, there is no existing theoretical results on multi-round auction with public




+ δE(V (c)) (2.26)
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in which, cm denotes the mean of the cost distribution, i.e., exp(xlθ1 + µl) in (2.10). It is known
after the structural estimation. As in the secret reserve price case, I construct the following recursive









(Pr(none|c) + Pr(i|c))h(c)dc× E(V (c))
The state variable updating is trivial here due to the random cost assumption (Assumption 4).
Compared with secret case, the change of MPE for public reserve price is two folded. First, the first
markup term in (2.26) differs from (2.8) by losing the ν part, and this leads to a larger bid in public
reserve price case. Second, all of the probability terms differ from the ones in Lemma 1. Under
public case, these probability terms in round j are,
Pr(i|c) = (1− F (cj))N−11bj≤r0 and Pr(none|c) = (1− (1− F (cj))N )1bj>r0 (2.27)
in which 1bj<r0 is an indicator function which equals to 1 if bj < r0, 0 otherwise. Pr(i|c) denotes
the probability of bidder i wins (with the lowest cost across bidders and the bid is lower than the
reserve price), and Pr(none|c) denotes that the probability of no wins (bid with smallest statistic
of cost is higher than the reserve price).
For counterfactual simulation, I draw the reserve price from g(·) for both case. With secret
reserve price, I draw directly from the estimated distribution H(·) from each auction Nl times (Nl
denotes the number of bidders in auction l), if the lowest draw is smaller than the reserve price draw,
it serves as the government expenditure for each simulation, otherwise, the auction goes into second
round. I set the government discount factor as 1 and focus on two rounds, I can then calculate
the expected expenditure and the probability of no sale for each auction.17 I repeat the procedure
for 100 times to calculate the standard error. For public reserve price, instead of drawing from the
estimated bid distribution, in round j, I draw cj ’s from the estimated cost distribution, and all the
probability terms and the cm can be calculated. Hence, given a δ, I can calculate the value function
and the bid bj . Hence both method 1 (number of potential bidders are kept fixed) and method 2
(number of potential bidders drops if someone drop a cost higher than reserve price) in last section
17Drawing from H(·) instead of cost distribution (then calculate bid from cost), I can significantly reduce the
computational burden at the expense of losing the ability to keep cost draws are identical for each bidder in each
auction as in myopic case. However, in terms of the mean level difference, this is a big issue with large simulation
times.
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can be applied here with a little bit revising. For instance, instead of using (2.22), I use (2.26) to
calculate bids in each round (we can use this repeatedly since it is the MPE). From results in Table
2.11 with high and low discount factor, one can see that when δ is small, using secret reserve price
is better for the government. This is consistent with results with myopic bidder. However, when
δ is large enough, using public reserve price is better for the government. Since first markup term
goes up for sure under public scenario, this means that the expected future value term (E(V )) in
the second markup terms has to decrease under public scenario. This is consistent with our finding
in the last section, i.e., the value function is increasing in the state variable (s∗j−1), by definition
I know that r0 ≤ s∗j−1, hence, the expected future value should be smaller in public reserve price
case. To sum up, when δ is small enough, the change in the second markup term is dominated by
the first one, so the government is better off with a secret reserve price, however, as δ increases, the
change of expected future value term dominates, hence, the government is better off with a public
reserve price. The difference between two methods is caused by different competition levels in two
experiments.
In addition, notice that when I calculate the value function in the last section, I draw bids
from a truncated distribution (upper truncation from s∗j−1 in round j), which is a strong assumption.
In order to be consistent with that assumption, I design a third counterfactual experiment. For secret
reserve price, everything stays the same. For public reserve price, things stay the same except for
that the costs are always drawn from a truncated distribution (upper truncated from ρ0). See results
in Table 2.11. With public reserve price, the probability of no sales is smaller, and the government
expenditure is lower with both high and low discount factor since the number of potential bidders are
fixed for different types of reserve price. However, since I draw the bid from a truncated distribution
when I estimate the cost, the cost distribution may already be underestimated, and when I draw
cost from truncated distribution to calculate the bid in the counterfactual study, I suffer from
underestimation more.
When there is no reserve price, bidders are not benefit from forward looking since they all
know that bidder with lowest bid wins the auction, i.e., probability of no winner is zeros, hence
forward looking and bid higher in first round is a weakly dominated strategy for them. For the no
reserve price case, I use results on government expenditure and probability of no sales from question
(II) in myopic part. With secret reserve price, I can just draw the bid distribution as before. See
simulation results in Table 2.11 for high and low discount factor. Clearly, the probability of no sale
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is always smaller in no reserve price case, but the expected expenditure for the government is always
lower under secret reserve price with forward looking bidders. However, the difference between these
two scenarios decreases as discount factor increases.
2.8 Conclusion.
This paper studies multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices using data
from INDOT. First, I derive the theoretical model with myopic risk averse bidders. I then estimate
the model structurally. Risk aversion of bidders is detected, yet the degree of risk aversion is not
huge. I also estimate the structural model with forward looking bidders. With results from the
structural estimation, various counterfactual studies are conducted. Compared with public reserve
prices, (I) with myopic bidders, the secret reserve prices generate a lower government expenditure
and probability of no sales; (II) for forward looking bidders with a high discount factor (δ), the
public reserve price works better for the government, while the secret reserve price works better for
bidders with lower δ. Compared with no reserve price case, for both types of bidders, secret reserve
price generates a lower government expenditure while suffering from a higher probability of no sales.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Statistics for bridge rehabilitation
Number of auctions in one round 431
Number of auctions in two round 61
Variable Description NOBS mean std deviation min max
Auction characteristics
DBE DBE percentage goal 431 6.40 3.78 0 15
Time working days needed 431 165.63 96.73 14 593
Np number of projects 431 1.22 0.72 1 9
Steel whether the bridge is steel 431 0.39 0.49 0 1
Length length of the bridge 431 91.14 108.21 3.22 825.70
Price
Rp reserve price 431 963121 1172975 28800 1.51e+07
bid1 bid for auction in 1 round 1860 1004656 1290214 35025.54 1.67e+07
b1 bid in first round for auction in 2 round 185 869127.9 888845.4 75483 6674048
b2 bid in second round for auction in 2 round 125 802579.7 814760.5 49240 4968742
Number of bidder
Nb number of bidder in round 1 431 4.74 2.06 1 11
Nb2 number of bidder in round 2 61 2.05 0.85 1 5
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Table 2.2: Summary of Statistics for bridge replacement.
Number of auctions in one round 468
Number of auctions in two round 28
Variable Description NOBS mean std deviation min max
Auction characteristics
DBE DBE percentage goal 468 6.87 2.84 0 14
Time working days needed 468 243.50 142.36 25 1059
Np number of projects 468 1.09 0.33 1 4
Steel whether the bridge is steel 468 0.07 0.25 0 1
Length length of the bridge 468 43.36 52.85 6.10 739.67
Price
Rp reserve price 468 1724403 5811613 272562.9 1.22e+08
bid1 bid for auction in 1 round 2422 1629144 5233161 212894.1 1.27e+08
b1 bid in first round for auction in 2 round 102 1775557 966886.8 516508.8 4242185
b2 bid in second round for auction in 2 round 65 1639553 955515.5 506232.8 4218794
Number of bidder
Nb number of bidder in round 1 468 5.39 2.21 1 14
Nb2 number of bidder in round 2 28 2.32 0.94 1 5
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Table 2.3: Study for reserve price18
No interaction With interactions
log(rp) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
nb −0.0045 0.0106 −0.0087 0.0099
round 2 −0.0326 0.0788 0.0728 0.0736
rehab −0.4664∗ 0.0505 −1.2713∗ 0.1501
DBE 0.0368∗ 0.0065 −0.0193∗ 0.0097
Time 0.0030∗ 0.0001 0.0016∗ 0.0002
Np 0.2184∗ 0.0407 0.3162∗ 0.0860
Steel 0.2642∗ 0.0568 0.5297∗ 0.1144






cons 12.5632∗ 0.0926 13.0095∗ 0.1307
# of Obv 899 899
Adjusted R2 0.4386 0.5358
18∗ means signifacant at 5%
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Table 2.4: Study for number of bidders
Truncated Poisson Truncated NB
nb Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
rehab −0.3404∗ 0.1135 −0.3418∗ 0.1135
DBE 0.0014 0.0071 0.0014 0.0071
Time 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
Np −0.0156 0.0629 −0.0156 0.0629
Steel −0.0486 0.0852 −0.0486 0.0852
Length 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004
DBE*rehab 0.0283 0.0234 0.0281 0.0214
Time*rehab 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
Np*rehab 0.0011 0.0716 0.0012 0.0716
Steel*rehab 0.0977 0.0974 0.1051 0.0976
Length*rehab 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005
cons 1.5920∗ 0.0881 1.5920∗ 0.0882
# of Obv 899 899
Log likelihood −1914.4841 −1914.3220
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Table 2.5: Study for bids with auction level random effects
No bidder’s info. With bidder’s info.
log(bid) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
nb −0.0167∗ 0.0088 −0.0242∗ 0.0081
round 2 −0.1669∗ 0.0348 −0.1389∗ 0.0299
nb*round 2 0.0188 0.0128 0.0112 0.0110
rehab −1.2941∗ 0.0736 −1.1237∗ 0.1631
DBE −0.0150∗ 0.0039 −0.0053 0.0097
Time 0.0016∗ 0.0001 0.0015∗ 0.0002
Np 0.1946∗ 0.0360 0.2701∗ 0.0856
Steel 0.4289∗ 0.0472 0.4857∗ 0.1132
Length 0.0073∗ 0.0003 0.0070∗ 0.0007
nb*rehab 0.0275∗ 0.0077 0.0402∗ 0.0184
DBE*rehab 0.0554∗ 0.0052 0.0659∗ 0.0125
Time*rehab 0.0027∗ 0.0002 0.0025∗ 0.0004
Np*rehab 0.0165 0.0403 −0.1151 0.0941
Steel*rehab −0.1936∗ 0.0538 −0.2516∗ 0.1275
Length*rehab −0.0053∗ 0.0003 −0.0052∗ 0.0008
state 0.0067 0.0831
total wins −0.0062∗ 0.0022
total bids 0.0013 0.0008
log(backolg) 0.0439∗ 0.0106
cons 13.1995∗ 0.0572 12.1792∗ 0.2502
# of Obv 4759 4759
Adjusted R2 0.5185 0.5129
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Table 2.6: SML Estimates of g(·)















Table 2.7: MSM Estimates of fj(·)
Round 1 Round 2
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
DBE 0.0223∗ 0.0320 0.0263∗ 0.1161
Time 0.0030∗ 0.0003 0.0022∗ 0.0025
Np 0.3454∗ 0.0019 0.3261∗ 0.0103
Steel 0.6266∗ 0.0182 0.5489∗ 0.0752
Length 0.0088∗ 0.0003 0.0086∗ 0.0011
rehab −2.0231∗ 0.0297 −1.9572∗ 02792
DBE*rehab 0.0794∗ 0.0112 0.0682∗ 0.0342
Time*rehab 0.0044∗ 0.0004 0.0042 0.0039
Np*rehab −0.0378 0.0958 −0.0297 0.0246
Steel*rehab −0.2805∗ 0.1293 −0.2602 0.1532
Length*rehab −0.0019∗ 0.0007 −0.0021∗ 0.0011
cons 12.8120∗ 0.0312 12.9972∗ 3.7182
η 1.0466∗ 0.0132 1.0237∗ 0.1161
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Table 2.8: SML Estimates of h(·)
Variables Coef. Std. Err.
DBE 0.0241∗ 0.0048












Table 2.9: SML Estimates of g(·) for secret reserve price not releasing ex post.















Table 2.10: Counterfactual analysis for myopic bidders
diff in government expenditure std.Err. diff in prob of no sale std.Err.
Question 1 Public-secret
1 68479 55932 0.0091 0.0109
2 115820∗ 56195 0.0307∗ 0.0127
Question 2 No-secret
1 173728∗ 39379 −0.0092∗ 0.0119
2 109361∗ 87501 −0.0312∗ 0.0021
Question 3 Not releasing-secret
1 −209132∗ 89701 0.3227∗ 0.0907
2 −199895∗ 90973 0.3512∗ 0.1221
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Table 2.11: Counterfactual analysis for forward looking bidders
diff in government expenditure std.Err. diff in prob of no sale std.Err.
Question 1 with δ = 0.95 Public-secret
1 −72928∗ 37210 −0.0293∗ 0.0121
2 −59203 39549 −0.0081 0.0119
3 −137382∗ 42926 −0.0321∗ 0.0126
Question 1 with δ = 0.35 Public-secret
1 49282 40972 0.0217 0.0221
2 92508∗ 30552 0.0299∗ 0.0127
3 −89973∗ 31824 −0.0092 0.0106
Question 2 with δ = 0.95 No-secret
1 119982∗ 32917 −0.0247∗ 0.0089
2 82905∗ 27482 −0.0451∗ 0.0202
Question 2 with δ = 0.35 No-secret
1 148289∗ 47501 −0.0173∗ 0.0077
2 89025∗ 29629 −0.0386∗ 0.0154
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Figure 2.1: Value function plot for bridge rehab/replacement project with various discount factor.
(a) Bridge rehabilitation (b) Bridge replacement
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Figure 2.2: Value function plot with various discount factor for bridge rehab/replacement project.
(a) δ = 0.95 (b) δ = 0.35
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Figure 2.3: Bid function for bridge rehabilitation project with various discount factors.
(a) δ = 0.95 (b) δ = 0.35
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Figure 2.4: Bid function forbridge replacement project with various discount factors.
(a) δ = 0.95 (b) δ = 0.35
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Figure 2.5: Cost distribution plot for various discount factors for both types projects.
(a) Bridge rehabilitation project (b) Bridge replacement project
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Figure 2.6: CDF for current and secret reserve price not release expost.
(a) Bridge rehabilitation project (b) Bridge replacement project
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Chapter 3
Testing strong disposability versus
weak disposability
3.1 Introduction
Most empirical studies on nonparametric frontier estimation assume a strong disposability
assumption for all of the inputs and outputs. However, there are also papers assuming weak dis-
posability. [Pittman, 1983] proposed that in holding the size of overall capital stock constant, any
increase in the capital input devoted to the control of undesirable outputs will result in a corre-
sponding reduction in the amount of desirable outputs. Therefore, any firm can potentially decrease
both desirable and undesirable outputs simultaneously without changing the inputs, and that is the
story of a weak disposability assumption. He then extended [Caves et al., 1982] translog multilateral
superlative indexes to include undesirable outputs together with desirable outputs. In this model
the desirable and undesirable outputs were treated asymmetrically. This new model was then used
on a 1976 sample of 30 mills which use pulp, together with the capital input, labor input and energy,
to produce paper and four undesirable pollutants. His results suggest that for industries in which
undesirable outputs are important, the inclusion of undesirable outputs in the model results in some
sizable changes in the efficiency rankings. Overall weakly disposable outputs appears whenever the
firm produces some unwanted by-products; for instance, all of firms in the energy related industries
can produce lots of waste along with the main products. Although in many cases we can identify
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which outputs are weakly disposable based on common sense, it would still be useful if we have a
formal test for this.
Intuition is different for the input side, since firms should not use “bad” inputs.1 However,
some inputs could be “good” initially but become “bad” when the firm uses too much of them.
[Färe and Svenso, 1980] first defined congestion in production in the following way: namely, if a
proper subset of inputs is kept fixed, increases in others may obstruct outputs. Considering a
standard production procedure, the firm produces its final products with the capital input and labor
input. Holding labor input fixed, an increase of capital input can have two kinds of effects: (i) a
direct effect on increasing production; (ii) an indirect effect on labor input redistribution. Assuming
that the capital level is so high that one more unit of capital could lead to a larger negative indirect
effect2 than the direct positive effect, we have a congestion issue. Notice that we should not observe
this if all firms are rational.
Now I will give a couple of concrete examples of weakly disposable inputs. The Degree
of competitions can not always be treated as a good input. Holding outputs constant, the firm
can reduce the level of other inputs with a moderate increment of competitions, since competitions
may drive firms to use other inputs more efficiently. For instance, the managers may find a way
to lower their costs by using all inputs more efficiently in order to be more competitive in the
market. However, over competition may lead to inefficient use of the other inputs. If the degree of
competitions became high, existing firms can use limit pricing or some other strategies to deter entry
or to make some incumbents quit. These strategic behaviors may make firms pay less attention on
optimizing the production procedure. [Athanassopoulos and Thanassoulis, 1995] propose a similar
story for retail outlets. Degrees of riskiness for commercial bank can be thought as another example
of weakly disposable inputs, since holding risky asset may be a main source for the bank’s profit.
However, holding too many risky assets can increase the probability of bank failure. At the same
time, savings deposits could be a weakly disposable input for the commercial banks too. During
the recent financial crisis, we observed that banks rejected deposits if they had already reached a
relatively high level, i.e., the interest rate can become negative with an additional amount of saving.
Some state-owned firms in China face the labor redundancy issue, since they hire more workers than
1Holding level of other inputs constant, more outputs are produced by using more “good” inputs, however, in-
creasing of “bad” inputs can cause a reduction in outputs.
2For instance, reallocation of labors to new machines could largely reduce the efficiency on operating those old
ones.
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they need to for various reasons: for instance, they do not want to fire some redundant workers
who are governors relatives. In this case, additional workers could became a “bad” input, since
redundant workers with no works to do may chat with each other which can reduce other workers’
efficiencies. [Allen, 1999] pointed out that waste in a waste-burning power plant can become a bad
input when the power plant has too much in stock, due to the fact that it can not be disposal freely.
As we have seen, weakly disposable inputs are more difficult to identify using just economic
theory, which call for a formal test for it. There are many existing literatures which assume weak
disposability for some of their inputs or outputs. Table 3.1 in Appendix presents a summary of
papers assuming weak disposability, in which the number of inputs, outputs and observations are
also included. All the existing literature makes strong or weak disposability assumptions based on
economic theory or intuition. To date, no formal way of testing weak disposability against strong
disposability exists.
One reason for the absence of a formal test is that almost all the analyses on inference on
the DEA estimators have been done under a strong disposability assumption. Under monotonicity
of the frontier which is analogue to the strong disposability assumption, [Korostelev et al., 1995]
have shown that the DEA frontier estimator is consistent with a known rate of convergence for
p = 1 case, namely only one input. For a p ≥ 1, q ≥ 1 case, namely multiple inputs or outputs
case, under a strong disposability assumption and some other conditions, consistency and rate
of convergence of DEA efficiency estimator have been established in [Kneip et al., 1998], and also
asymptotic distribution of DEA efficiency estimators under variable return to scale (VRS) has been
derived in [Kneip et al., 2008]. In order to develop a test, we must first derive the rate of convergence
of DEA estimators under weak diposability assumption.
In this paper, we derive the rate of convergence and show the existence of the asymptotic
distribution of DEA efficiency estimators under the weak disposability assumption together with
other conditions similar to [Kneip et al., 2008], by a similar reasoning as in [Kneip et al., 1998] and
[Kneip et al., 2008]. These results allow us to make inference on the DEA efficiency estimator under
weak disposability and develop a way to test the weak against strong disposability assumption
following [Kneip et al., 2013]. [Kneip et al., 2014] derive central limit theorem results for DEA and
free disposable hull (FDH) estimators. Subsequently, [Kneip et al., 2013] develop methods for testing
hypotheses about the model structure such as returns to scale or the convexity of the production
set.
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Monte Carlo simulations indicate that the test works well in terms of the power and the size
for small numbers of inputs and outputs and with a small sample size. As with most of nonparametric
tests, increasing sample sizes are necessary as the number of inputs and outputs increases in order to
get the correct size and reasonable power for the test. Several real world data sets are also applied.
I find that the inputs strong disposability assumption of banking industry (a common assumption
to make) in the United States is rejected. In particular, strong disposability assumptions on both
labor inputs and loanable funds are rejected.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts and notations
in frontier models and the underlying statistical models, and distinguishes between my assumptions
and those used by [Kneip et al., 2008]. Section 3 proposes the test statistics. The performance of
the test is examined by Monte Carlo experiments described in Section 4. The test is applied to
several real world data sets in Section 5, and conclusions are given in the final section.
3.2 Frontier model and assumptions
3.2.1 Frontier analysis and DEA estimators
The notation of this paper follows [Kneip et al., 2008]. Suppose that firms use input quan-
tities x ∈ Rp+ to produce output quantities y ∈ R
q
+. The production set
Ψ = {(x,y) | x can produce y} (3.1)
in the meanwhile, ∂(Ψ) := frontier of Ψ.
Several different measures of technical efficiency are available. We use the [Farrell, 1957]
measure of input efficiency, defined by
θ(x,y) ≡ inf{δ | (δx,y) ∈ Ψ, δ > 0} (3.2)
for any points (x,y) ∈ Rp+q+ . For (x,y) ∈ Ψ, we can see that 0 < θ(x,y) ≤ 1. Note that θ provides
a Euclidean distance measure from (x,y) to ∂(Ψ) in a direction parallel to the input axes.
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Under a strong disposability assumption, the DEA estimator of Ψ is given by
Ψ̂S =
{
(x,y) | y ≤ Y q, x ≥Xq, i′q = 1, q ∈ Rn+
}
, (3.3)
where Y = [y1 . . .yn], X = [x1 . . .xn], i denotes an (n × 1) vector of ones, and q is an (n × 1)
vector of intensity variables. The corresponding DEA estimator of θ(x,y) is obtained by replacing
Ψ with Ψ̂S in (3.2); i.e.,
θ̂S(x,y) = min
{
δ > 0 | y ≤ Y q, δx ≥Xq, i′q = 1, q ∈ Rn+
}
. (3.4)
Minimization of the linear program in (3.4) provides a solution for both δ and q.
Under a weak disposability assumption, the DEA estimator of Ψ is given by
Ψ̂W =
{
(x,y) ∈ Rp+q+ | µyy = Y q, µxx = Xq, µy ≥ 1, µx ∈ [0, 1], i
′q = 1, q ∈ Rn+
}
, (3.5)
where Y = [y1 . . .yn], X = [x1 . . .xn], i denotes an (n × 1) vector of ones, and q is an (n × 1)
vector of intensity variables. The corresponding DEA estimator of θW (x,y) is obtained by replacing
Ψ with Ψ̂W in (3.2); i.e.,
θ̂W (x,y) = min
δ,a,µx,µy
{δ > 0 | µyy = Y q, µxδx = Xq,
µy ≥ 1, µx ∈ [0, 1], i′q = 1, q ∈ Rn+}. (3.6)
Notice that, the nonlinear programming problem for θ̂W differs from the one for θ̂S by including µx
and µy and not allowing slacks. Thus θ̂S is a special case of θ̂W , since θ̂S = θ̂W when µx = µy = 1.
The nonlinear programming in (3.6) can be transfer it into linear programming
θ̂W (x,y) = min
δ,a,µ∗x,µy
{δ > 0 | µyy = Y q, µ∗xx = Xq,
µy ≥ 1, µ∗x − δ ≤ 0, µ∗x ≥ 0, i
′q = 1, q ∈ Rn+} (3.7)
by introducing µ∗x = µxδ.
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3.2.2 Assumptions
Various economic assumptions regarding Ψ are possible; we develop our assumptions based
on [Kneip et al., 2008] and [Kneip et al., 2014]:
Assumption 1. Ψ is closed and strictly convex.
Assumption 2. (x,y) 6∈ Ψ if x = 0, y ≥ 0,y 6= 0, i.e., all production requires use of some inputs.
Assumption 3. If (x,y) ∈ Ψ then (λx,y) ∈ Ψ and (x, 1λy) ∈ Ψ ∀ λ ≥ 1, i.e., in this case, both
inputs and outputs are weakly disposable.
Assumption 1-2 are same as [Kneip et al., 2008] and [Kneip et al., 1998], yet Assumption 3 is differ-
ent. In particular, Assumption 3 reduces the assumption of strong disposability. In fact, we could
also allow that a subset of inputs are weakly disposable, while others are strongly disposable.
In real world, Ψ and hence θ(x,y) are unknown and must be estimated from a sample
of observations Sn = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1. The next three assumptions define a data generation process
(DGP); the framework here is the similar as in [Kneip et al., 2008], but Assumption 5-6 are stronger
than Assumption 5-6 in [Kneip et al., 2008]. Particularly, Assumption 5-6 here are borrow from
[Kneip et al., 2014]. Notice that Assumption 5-6 here can be substituted by Assumption 5-6 in
[Kneip et al., 2008] when I derive the rate of convergence and show the existence of the asymptotic
distribution of DEA estimator under weak disposability assumption. Yet, Assumption 5-6 here are
necessary when I develop the test.
Assumption 4. The n observations in Sn are identically, independently distributed (iid) random
variables on the convex attainable set Ψ.
Assumption 5. (a) The (X,Y ) possess a joint density f with support D ⊆ Ψ; (b) f is continuous
on D; (c) f(θ(x,y)x,y) > 0 for all (x,y) in the interior of D; and (d) D is strictly convex.
Assumption 6. The function θ(x, y) is three times continuously differentiable for all (x, y) ∈ D.
One example to illustrate the main difference between a strong disposability assumption
and a weak disposability assumption is given by Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1b shows an isoquant under
a strong disposability assumption, i.e., to keep the same output level, firms can always substitute
between x1 and x2. Figure 3.1a shows an isoquant for p = 2 under a weak disposability assumption,
i.e., to keep the same output level, firms sometimes need to increase both x1 and x2.
84
3.3 Testing strong versus weak disposability
Applying the central limit theorem for DEA efficiency score in [Kneip et al., 2014], [Kneip et al., 2013]
tested the returns to scale and the convexity of the attainable set. Following [Kneip et al., 2014] and
[Kneip et al., 2013] we want to develop a test for weak versus strong disposability. [Kneip et al., 1998]
give the rates of convergence of θ̂(x, y) under a strong disposability assumption. [Kneip et al., 2008]
show the existence of the asymptotic distribution of DEA estimators under a strong disposability
for the general case with arbitrary numbers of inputs p and outputs q. In order to develop a test, we
must first derive the rate of convergence of DEA estimators and show the existence of the asymptotic
distribution of it under a weak diposability assumption.
We first investigate the rate of convergence of DEA estimators under a weak disposability
assumption by the similar method as [Kneip et al., 1998]. Hence, we will prove consistency of θ̂(x, y)
for a given (x, y) and give the rates of convergence to the true but unknown θ(x, y) by the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, ∀ (x, y) ∈ int(D), θ̂(x, y)− θ(x, y) = OP (n−
2
p+q+1 ).
It turns out that this rate is the same as the rate for DEA estimator under the strong
disposability assumption. This result is also required for our study in next section in which we show
the asymptotic distribution of DEA estimator under the weak disposability assumption.
Formal proof for Corollary 1 is omitted here since it is close to the proof for Theorem 1 in
[Kneip et al., 1998]. Instead, I list the main difference between Corollary 1 in paper and Theorem 1
in [Kneip et al., 1998]. The main difference in proving these two theorems comes after equation (4.4)
in [Kneip et al., 1998]. Under a strong disposability assumption, take a two inputs case for example
(see Figure 3.1b for an illustration), when we make the transformation into polar coordinates, the
angle is in [0, π2 ]. However, under a weak disposability assumption the angle is in [0, η], where η <
π
2
(see Figure 3.1a for an illustration). However, equation (4.5) in [Kneip et al., 1998] holds no matter
η = π2 or η <
π
2 ,
3 and therefore the main result in Theorem 1 in [Kneip et al., 1998] holds under
weak disposability assumption.
We next show the existence of the asymptotic distribution of DEA estimators under weak
disposability for the general case with arbitrary numbers of inputs p and outputs q using the existing
results on strong disposability in [Kneip et al., 2008]. Lemma 1 in [Kneip et al., 2008] holds under





the weak disposability assumption since strong disposability assumption is used but too strong in
the proof.4 We showed that the rate of convergence of the input inefficiency estimator is n2/(p+q+1)
under the weak disposability assumption. The following lemma shows that the problem of specifying
the distribution of θ̂WD(x,y)θ(x,y) can be reformulated in terms of the distribution of θ(Xi, Yi), Zi and Yi
and of gx.









= Prob(A[δ∗, n]), (3.8)
where A[δ∗, n] denotes the following event: There exist some constants α1 ≥ 0, . . . , αn ≥ 0 with∑n













− 1 ≤ δ∗n−
2
p+q+1 , (3.9)
where θi = θ(Xi, Yi), Zi = Xi − x
TXi









The proof of Lemma 1 is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in [Kneip et al., 2008], but with
some small differences. The y and δ in [Kneip et al., 2008] have been redefined here as y∗ and
δ∗, in which y∗ = µyy and δ
∗ = δµx . See a formal proof in Appendix. Proofs of Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 in [Kneip et al., 2008] do not use the strong disposability assumption.5 Thus, asymptotic
distribution of the θ̂W (λx,y) exists as well.
With the rate of convergence of DEA estimator and the existence of the asymptotic dis-
tribution of DEA estimators under the strong and weak disposability assumption, I can develop
a test on strong versus weak disposability. Given a single iid sample Sn = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1, under
the null hypothesis of strong disposability, both VRS-DEA estimators under strong or weak dispos-
ability assumption are consistent, but under the alternative, only the VRS-DEA estimator under
weak disposability assumption is consistent. By central limit theorem for DEA efficiency scores
in [Kneip et al., 2014], we can test whether the production set Ψ is strongly versus weakly dispos-
able using methods similar to those in [Kneip et al., 2013], where tests of returns to scale and the
4Lemma 1 [Kneip et al., 2008] present properties of gx which involves transforming the coordinate system and
representing the frontier as a function. I define gx in proof of Lemma 1 and see details in [Kneip et al., 2008]. Under
Assumption 1, 3 and 6 in this paper, gx still exists and has the same properties as in Lemma 1 of [Kneip et al., 2008].
5Theorem 1 localizes the frontier problem and provides results on uniform convergence on suitable subsets. Theorem
2 shows the existence of asymptotic distribution of θ̂S(λx,y).
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convexity of the attainable set are developed.
As long as Lemma 1 in this paper holds, the strong disposability assumption can be sub-
stituted by weak disposability in Theorem 3.1 which gives moments of the VRS-DEA estimator in
[Kneip et al., 2014] since the strong disposability assumption is not used in the proof. Hence Theo-
rem 4.1-4.3 in [Kneip et al., 2014] holds for the same reason under weak disposability.6 By Theorem
4.2-4.3 in [Kneip et al., 2013] and using the same argument as in [Kneip et al., 2014], under the null
hypothesis of strong disposability, for p+ q < 4 case we have
τ̂1,n =







for p+ q ≥ 4 we have
τ̂2,n =



































in which, κ = 2p+q+1 . B̂W,κ,n1 and B̂S,κ,n2 are the related bias correction terms, and see [Kneip et al., 2013]
for details.
6Theorem 4.1 proposes a consistent estimator of variance and establishes the properties of the mean of DEA
estimator. Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 show the property of the DEA estimator with different p+ q.
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3.4 Simulation
3.4.1 Rate of converagence
We conduct a Monte Carlo experiment to show evidence for the rate of convergence of DEA
estimator under the a weak disposability assumption. For the case p = 2, q = 0, the function of the
isoquant is given by,




In the Monte Carlo experiment, we generate random numbers on the isoquant by drawing x1 from
U( 15 , 5), and then calculate x2 by (3.12). The PDF for θ is given by,
f(t) = 5e−5t,∀ t ∈ (0,∞) (3.13)
in which θ ∈ (0,∞) in this case. To ensure that the inefficiency measure is greater or equal than 1,
let x = [x1, x2], so we have that xineff = (1 + θ)x.
For a fixed point (x0, y0) which is on the edge of the attainable set, if we draw kernel density
plot of κ(θ̂W (x0, y0)− θW (x0, y0)) with the correct rate of convergence κ, we would expect to see a
stabilized distribution as the sample size increases, otherwise, the distribution either collapse into a
point mass or has a infinite variance. See Figure 3.2 for one trial with sample size 100 for the points
on the frontier and fixed point (x0, y0) which is (2, 2.75) with θW (2, 2.75) =
√
6
2 .The density gets
stabilized as sample size becomes large for κ = 2p+q+1 as in Figure 3.3a, on the other hand, with a
wrong κ, the density starts to collapse into a Dirac delta function as sample size goes large as in
Figure 3.3b.
3.4.2 Power and size of the test
For the case p = 2, q = 0, the function of the isoquant is given by




in which δ = 0 if both inputs are strongly disposable, δ > 0 if x2 is weakly disposable.
For Monte Carlo experiments, we generate random numbers on the isoquant by drawing x1
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e−t/λ,∀ t ∈ (0,∞) (3.15)
in which θ ∈ (0,∞) in this case. To ensure that the inefficiency measure is greater or equal than 1,
let x = [x1, x2], so, xineff = (1 + θ)x. Figure 3.4a is the case with n = 100 and λ = 0.2. For case of
weak disposability, i.e. δ = 1, see Figure 3.4b for an illustration.
For the case that δ = 0, there is clearly a shortcoming of previous data generation process.
Although the frontier is symmetric about y = x, it is easy to see from Figure 3.4a that we have
way more points below y = x, which is due to the way we generate x = 1. To fix this, I use the
following method. Since we know that x2 =
1
x1
is symmetry about y = x, so first, I generate 50 x1
from U(1, 4), and calculate x2 from by (3.14). Then, by symmetry, we get observation such that
x1 ∈ ( 14 , 1) by mirror imagining the points such that x1 ∈ (1, 4) by y = x (see Figure 3.4c for an
illustration).
For p = 2 and q = 0, bias corrections are not necessary. To conduct the Monte Carlo
experiment, I draw x1 from U(0.02, 50), and then calculate x2. I tried various λ’s in (3.15). For
p = 2 and q = 1 case, the function for the isoquant is given by
y =
√
x1x2 − δx21 (3.16)
in which δ = 0 if both inputs are strongly disposable, δ > 0 if x2 is weakly disposable.
For q = 1 case, we generate random numbers on the production frontier by drawing xi from
U(0, 5), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, and then calculate the output y by (3.16). The inefficient observations are
calculated in the same way as before. By the results in [Kneip et al., 2014], we need to correct bias









7J ∈ ρ(I), in which, I := {2, 3, . . . , p}, and ρ(I) denotes the power set of I, so the only input must be strongly
disposable is x1 here, and all the others could be either strongly or weakly disposable. Of course, we can also assign
different δ to different inputs.
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See Table 3.2-3.4 for Monte Carlo results of the size of test for varies λ, i.e., λ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 5}.
It turns out that we tend to over reject more as λ increases. Also, as p+ q goes up, the issue of over
rejection become more severe.
Fixing λ = 0.2, Table 3.5-3.7 report the Monte Carlo results of the power of the test for varies δ,
i.e., δ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1}. Clearly, as δ increases, the power of the test goes up.
3.5 Real world data
Here I use several real world data sets to demonstrate that the test which I construct above
has a moderate power and size. [Charnes et al., 1981] studied the efficiency of some educational
programs. All inputs (mother’s education, highest occupation of family, parental visit index, parent
counseling index and number of teachers) and outputs (total reading score, total mathematics score
and measure of self-esteem) are assumed to be strongly disposable. The number of observation is
70. For input direction, we get test statistic 3.05, and the corresponding p value is 0.0011. For
output direction, we get test statistic -3.29, and the corresponding p value is 0.9994. The result for
the inputs side is clearly not consistent with assumptions made by the authors. As we have seen in
the simulation results, when the dimensions increase, without enough number of observations, the
test may suffer from the over rejection problem. Hence, when p + q > 4 in this case, we need to
use a strict subset of the subsample to calculate the mean difference. This can not be attained by a
sample with 70 observations.
[Aly et al., 1990] studied the overall, technical, pure technical, allocative, and scale efficien-
cies for a sample of 322 independent U.S. banks. In their study, all inputs (labor, physical capital
and loanable funds) and outputs (real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans,
other loans and demand deposits) are assumed to be strongly disposable. For input direction, we
get test statistic 1.69, and the corresponding p value is 0.0455. For output direction, we get test
statistic 3.26, and the corresponding p value is 0.0006.
8It is clear that if δ = 0, we would have a Cobb-Douglas production function with p inputs. All inputs could be
weakly disposable other than x1.
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I did the same analysis with the updated version of the banking data with more number
of observations(from year 2007 to 2012). Take year 2012 for instance, we have 5894 number of
observations with the same p+ q. The number of observations does not varies much across these six
years. For input direction, we tend to reject strong disposability assumption except for year 2007.
On the other hand, for output direction, we can not reject strong disposability assumption for all
these years (see results of the test in Table 3.8 and mean level efficiency in Table 3.11). To identify
which input causes the weak disposability, we need to use the method that I will mention in the
next part.
Many studies in environmental economics apply DEA estimators under weak disposability
on the Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID) to analysis the efficiency level
of electric power generation plants in the United States, for instance, [Sarkis and Cordeiro, 2009],
[Sarkis and Cordeiro, 2012] and [Tone and Tsutsui, 2011]. In these studies, all inputs (total gener-
ation capacity and fuel consumption) and some outputs (nonfossil and fossil power generation) are
assume to be strongly disposable while the other outputs are not (NOx and SO2 emission). Take
year 2009 for example, we have 1155 observations. With the test, for input direction, we get test
statistic 0.68, and the corresponding p value is 0.2482. However, for output direction, we get test
statistic 3.32, and the corresponding p value is 0.0004. Hence, our test results are consistent with
the authors’ assumptions. Notice that all of these test statistics could vary by a little bit from time
to time due to the random sampling.
To identify which specific input or output is weakly disposable, we use the following strategy.
First, as before we calculate the test statistics, which serve as the baseline case. Then, we calculate
the test statistics again by imposing strong disposability assumption for one or a group of inputs
(xs) or outputs, while keep weakly disposability assumption for all other inputs (xw) or outputs (we
could approach this by changing the linear program problem). At the end, we find the difference
between these test statistics and the one from baseline case. If x1 is a weakly disposable input, by
imposing strongly disposability, the difference between these two test statistics should be larger than
the case in which we calculate the difference with a strongly disposable input. At the same time,
the second test statistic itself could indicate that whether we can reject the strong disposability
assumption on xw or not conditional on xs is truely strongly disposable.
We verify this assertion by the eGRID data, since for the output direction, it is obvious which
two are weakly disposable outputs. If we impose strong disposability on NOx and SO2 emission, the
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test statistic is -6.604, and we can not reject output strong disposability assumption conditional on
NOx and SO2 emission being strongly disposable. However, if we impose strong disposability on the
other two outputs, the test statistic is 3.31, and in this case we can reject output strong disposability
assumption conditional on the power generation is strongly disposable. In the meanwhile, we got a
number much closer to the one we got in the baseline case (3.32) in the second case. This simple
trial supports our assertion.
Now I will use the same method for the banking data to see which input is weakly disposable
(see results in Table 3.9). It is obvious that imposing strong disposability on that the physical
capital give the least difference, and we tend to reject strong disposability assumption conditional
on physical capital is strong disposable. Labor and loanable funds are more likely to be weak
disposable especially after 2007. For loanable funds, it seems more like to be a weakly disposable
input even in 2007. Strong disposability can not be rejected if strong disposability assumption is
imposed on both labor and loanable funds (see results in Table 3.10).
3.6 Conclusion
This paper extends the results of [Kneip et al., 1998] and [Kneip et al., 2008], and derive the
rate of convergence and the asymptotic distribution of the DEA estimators under weak disposability
assumption. It turns out that the results in [Kneip et al., 1998] and [Kneip et al., 2008] still hold
when we release the strong disposability assumption into weak disposability while keeping others
the same. Using the bootstrap method introduced in [Kneip et al., 2008] and [Kneip et al., 2011],
we can make inference about the efficiency of individual firms under weak disposability. With the
results of rate of convergence and existence of asymptotic distribution of DEA estimator under both
strong and weak disposability assumption, we are able to construct a formal test for whether we have
input or output weak disposability or not, following the methods introduced in [Kneip et al., 2014]
and [Kneip et al., 2013].
Monte Carlo results are provided as the evidence for the rate of convergence we derived and
the power and size of the test. It turns out that the test suffers from over rejection when sample size
is small, but the size of the test becomes better as sample size increases. Even considering effects of
the over rejection, the test can reject the strong disposability assumption when weakly disposable
inputs exist with a moderate sample size. Results of the test using real world are consistent with
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the existing theory too. Using eGRID data, we can reject the strong disposability assumption on
outputs sides when negative byproducts exist. In particular, we can also provide evidence on which
outputs are not strongly disposable. In the meanwhile, using the banking data from 2007-2012,
we find that we tend to reject the strong disposability assumption on labor and loanable funds,
especially after year 2008.
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Table 3.1: Papers with weak disposability assumption
Paper Topic WD input or output p q n
[Ferrier et al., 2006] health uncompensated care 5 6 170
[Clement et al., 2008] health risk-adjusted patient mortality 4 15 667
[Jahanshahloo and Khodabakhshi, 2008] texile labor 2 1 17
[Jahanshahloo et al., 2012] airport area 3 3 45
[Divandari et al., 2006] bank labor 3 5 50
[Flegg and Allen, 2009] texile labor 2 1 17
[Cooper et al., 2001] automobile labor 2 1 17
[Flegg and Allen, 2007] university # of students 4 3 45
[Wu and Chen, 2013] energy negative byproducts (water and gas) 2 3 28
[Brockett et al., 1998] metallurgy and chemical labor 1 1 23
[Yang and Pollitt, 2009] Coal-Fired Power Plants negative byproducts (gas) 3 4 582
[Byrnes et al., 1984] Coal mine (stripe) Coal 8 1 15
[Byrnes et al., 1988] Coal mine (surface) Coal 7 1 197
[Zhou et al., 2007] environment undesirable gases 2 5 26
[Shaik and Helmers, 2003] agriculture risks 5 3 15
[Piot-Lepetit and Vermersch, 1998] pig farm organic nitrogen 8 3 107
[Mekaroonreung and Johnson, 2010] oil refinement toxic release 3 3 113
[Guan and Alfons, 2003] farming damage abatement inputs 8 3 1072
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Table 3.2: Size of the test with various distributions
n γ p = 2, q = 0 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 5
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01
50 0.1 0.122 0.045 0.006 0.213 0.167 0.099 0.473 0.412 0.321 0.501 0.372 0.298 0.597 0.483 0.401
0.2 0.127 0.062 0.013 0.165 0.121 0.062 0.503 0.453 0.349 0.522 0.429 0.313 0.612 0.528 0.443
0.5 0.129 0.060 0.006 0.227 0.165 0.089 0.517 0.462 0.362 0.532 0.434 0.327 0.647 0.541 0.497
1 0.131 0.071 0.015 0.202 0.155 0.089 0.553 0.495 0.379 0.551 0.441 0.349 0.691 0.588 0.517
5 0.268 0.157 0.042 0.228 0.187 0.125 0.589 0.505 0.398 0.592 0.492 0.371 0.776 0.672 0.596
100 0.1 0.119 0.051 0.015 0.187 0.118 0.057 0.317 0.253 0.155 0.374 0.301 0.172 0.402 0.375 0.295
0.2 0.124 0.054 0.014 0.198 0.144 0.054 0.363 0.291 0.183 0.407 0.323 0.189 0.447 0.398 0.328
0.5 0.139 0.059 0.015 0.210 0.155 0.063 0.379 0.303 0.192 0.453 0.364 0.269 0.502 0.437 0.361
1 0.148 0.060 0.015 0.243 0.165 0.078 0.402 0.334 0.219 0.492 0.390 0.299 0.573 0.489 0.431
5 0.224 0.134 0.032 0.300 0.235 0.130 0.481 0.390 0.297 0.551 0.453 0.349 0.659 0.567 0.425
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Table 3.3: Size of the test with various distributions
n γ p = 2, q = 0 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 5
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01
200 0.1 0.117 0.050 0.008 0.114 0.078 0.035 0.224 0.169 0.089 0.292 0.208 0.129 0.301 0.238 0.209
0.2 0.115 0.053 0.070 0.138 0.079 0.031 0.246 0.180 0.097 0.305 0.221 0.141 0.327 0.258 0.221
0.5 0.143 0.087 0.020 0.154 0.115 0.045 0.304 0.211 0.127 0.372 0.277 0.182 0.398 0.289 0.252
1 0.140 0.066 0.005 0.190 0.135 0.061 0.371 0.304 0.173 0.409 0.329 0.217 0.423 0.348 0.267
5 0.195 0.092 0.020 0.272 0.219 0.131 0.409 0.349 0.221 0.472 0.391 0.291 0.496 0.412 0.329
1000 0.1 0.102 0.050 0.010 0.120 0.060 0.016 0.137 0.068 0.030 0.125 0.057 0.015 0.131 0.089 0.033
0.2 0.104 0.052 0.012 0.124 0.060 0.018 0.148 0.074 0.032 0.124 0.069 0.021 0.150 0.092 0.024
0.5 0.106 0.056 0.014 0.130 0.066 0.021 0.162 0.089 0.041 0.141 0.078 0.037 0.174 0.130 0.054
1 0.113 0.061 0.015 0.169 0.104 0.034 0.189 0.101 0.053 0.167 0.097 0.032 0.232 0.161 0.073
5 0.162 0.082 0.020 0.229 0.181 0.090 0.257 0.209 0.104 0.219 0.131 0.071 0.257 0.174 0.072
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Table 3.4: Size of the test with various distributions
n γ p = 2, q = 0 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 5
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01
10000 0.1 0.099 0.050 0.009 0.101 0.050 0.011 0.099 0.051 0.011 0.102 0.052 0.011 0.098 0.051 0.011
0.2 0.101 0.051 0.011 0.098 0.049 0.011 0.097 0.0049 0.009 0.105 0.052 0.011 0.104 0.054 0.012
0.5 0.103 0.052 0.011 0.105 0.054 0.012 0.106 0.055 0.014 0.108 0.055 0.014 0.108 0.056 0.013
1 0.115 0.056 0.012 0.112 0.057 0.014 0.115 0.058 0.017 0.114 0.054 0.014 0.117 0.058 0.015
5 0.127 0.061 0.016 0.129 0.063 0.017 0.134 0.067 0.021 0.123 0.059 0.018 0.131 0.062 0.018
20000 0.1 0.101 0.050 0.010 0.099 0.050 0.098 0.0102 0.049 0.012 0.098 0.050 0.011 0.102 0.102 0.099
0.2 0.010 0.052 0.011 0.101 0.051 0.010 0.102 0.049 0.099 0.102 0.052 0.011 0.102 0.052 0.011
0.5 0.101 0.051 0.010 0.102 0.052 0.012 0.103 0.052 0.011 0.102 0.051 0.099 0.103 0.053 0.012
1 0.105 0.053 0.012 0.106 0.052 0.013 0.109 0.055 0.013 0.104 0.052 0.012 0.107 0.055 0.012
5 0.113 0.057 0.012 0.112 0.056 0.011 0.115 0.057 0.014 0.113 0.054 0.013 0.116 0.057 0.015
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Table 3.5: Power of the test with various degree of disposability
n δ p = 2, q = 0 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 5
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01
50 0 0.127 0.062 0.013 0.165 0.121 0.062 0.503 0.453 0.349 0.572 0.429 0.313 0.597 0.483 0.401
0.1 0.425 0.264 0.078 0.303 0.239 0.143 0.624 0.529 0.429 0.718 0.678 0.566 0.742 0.703 0.698
0.2 0.942 0.870 0.666 0.392 0.312 0.173 0.690 0.593 0.482 0.824 0.803 0.714 0.871 0.839 0.749
0.5 1 1 1 0.513 0.432 0.292 0.922 0.878 0.749 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0.972 0.865 0.689 0.961 0.937 0.861 1 1 1 1 1 1
100 0 0.124 0.054 0.014 0.198 0.144 0.054 0.363 0.291 0.183 0.407 0.323 0.189 0.447 0.398 0.328
0.1 0.330 0.201 0.059 0.264 0.206 0.102 0.578 0.469 0.323 0.684 0.604 0.444 0.772 0.709 0.692
0.2 0.961 0.915 0.749 0.297 0.220 0.109 0.683 0.575 0.426 0.827 0.812 0.709 0.882 0.753 0. 713
0.5 1 1 1 0.837 0.766 0.577 0.997 0.990 0.964 0.982 0.974 0.962 1 0.985 0.963
1 1 1 1 0.988 0.977 0.902 1 0.998 0.978 1 1 0.992 1 1 1
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Table 3.6: Power of the test with various degree of disposability
n δ p = 2, q = 0 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 5
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01
200 0 0.115 0.053 0.070 0.138 0.079 0.031 0.246 0.180 0.097 0.305 0.221 0.141 0.327 0.258 0.221
0.1 0.356 0.225 0.069 0.478 0.359 0.194 0.566 0.416 0.311 0.552 0.412 0.229 0.693 0.615 0.307
0.2 0.975 0.939 0.810 0.464 0364 0.197 0.659 0.574 0.378 0.664 0.517 0.240 0.769 0.647 0.349
0.5 1 1 1 0.965 0.932 0.800 1 0.999 0.993 0.996 0.983 0.939 1 1 0.982
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.993 1 1 1 1 1 0.998 1 1 1
1000 0 0.098 0.048 0.012 0.124 0.060 0.018 0.158 0.078 0.033 0.139 0.069 0.021 0.150 0.092 0.024
0.1 0.625 0.490 0.227 0.674 0.577 0.377 0.781 0.637 0.489 0.734 0.671 0.472 0.692 0.607 0.438
0.2 1 1 1 0.702 0.598 0.380 1 0.999 0.992 0.996 0.989 0.963 0.973 0.967 0.939
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 3.7: Power of the test with various degree of disposability
n δ p = 2, q = 0 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 5
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01
10000 0 0.101 0.051 0.011 0.098 0.049 0.011 0.097 0.0049 0.009 0.105 0.052 0.011 0.104 0.054 0.012
0.1 0.998 0.996 0.983 0.947 0.919 0.798 0.989 0.957 0.854 0.914 0.839 0.661 0.823 0.753 0.578
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 0.973 1 1 1 1 0.998 0.992 0.996 0.992 0.983
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20000 0 0.010 0.052 0.011 0.101 0.051 0.010 0.102 0.049 0.099 0.102 0.052 0.011 0.102 0.052 0.011
0.1 1 1 0.995 1 1 0.983 1 1 0.998 1 1 0.981 1 1 0.972
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
100
Table 3.8: Banking test result
Input Output
Year z-score p-value z-score p-value
2007 -0.7901 0.7853 0.0241 0.4904
2008 1.6679 0.0476 -0.1272 0.5506
2009 1.7012 0.0445 -0.1007 0.5401
2010 1.8439 0.0326 0.1749 0.4306
2011 1.2982 0.0971 -0.2106 0.5834
2012 2.0917 0.0182 -0.6892 0.7547
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Table 3.9: Banking test result by inputs
labor physical capital loanable funds
Year z-score p-value z-score p-value z-score p-value
2007 -1.1237 0.8694 -1.5944 0.9446 -8.6625 1
2008 -11.3891 1 2.0089 0.0223 -11.3891 1
2009 -11.1450 1 2.0294 0.0212 -15.7038 1
2010 -10.2903 1 1.6992 0.0446 -10.3921 1
2011 -10.9250 1 0.8439 0.1993 -14.8883 1
2012 -8.4990 1 2.1170 0.0171 -19.7388 1
102









Table 3.11: Mean efficiency of banks.
Year Input Output
SD WD SD WD
2007 2.8439 1.8961 0.3948 0.3119
2008 2.8455 1.8248 0.3975 0.3446
2009 3.0800 2.0060 0.3648 0.2606
2010 3.2587 2.5319 0.3462 0.3146
2011 2.4830 2.0582 0.4623 0.4109
2012 2.4192 1.9679 0.4571 0.2762
104
Figure 3.1: Graphic Examples
(a) Isoquant of Weakly Disposable
(b) Isoquant of Strong Disposable
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Figure 3.2: One trial for the simulation
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Figure 3.3: Rate of convergence
(a) Right rate of convergence
(b) Wrong rate of convergence
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Figure 3.4: Isoquant and inefficient observations
(a) Asymmetric strong disposability (b) Weak disposability




Appendix A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Chapter 1
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For simplicity, the subscripts n and j in β(·), c(·, ·), f(·|·) and F (·|·) are dropped in deriva-





















in which s∗j−1 denotes the lowest bids in the previous round. After solving the first order condition
out for (A.1) and plugging in z = x by symmetry, I have
β′(x) = (β(x)− c(x, x))(G(s∗j−1)−G(β(x)))f(x|x)× (A.2)[























Notice that when j = 1, I set s∗0 = x̄, hence G(s
∗
0) = 1.
As in [Hong and Shum, 2002], I can decompose of BNE into the winner’s curse effects and the



















































For round j > 1, I get the similar result with the same method, i.e.,

















A.2.1 Proof for Theorem 1
Let β(·) denote the symmetric increasing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. Since
it is the same ∀ bidders i, I can drop the subscript i. Let j denote the round of the auction. For j=1
case, the objective function is,
max
b1
π1 = η(b1 − c1)
1
η (1− F1(β−11 (b1)))N−1(1−G(b1))
FOC : 0 = (b1 − c)
1
η−1(1− F1(β−11 (b1)))N−1(1−G(b1))
− η(b1 − c1)
1








− η(b1 − c1)
1
η (1− F1(β−11 (b1)))N−1g(b1) (A.6)
we can replace b1 with β1(c),
β′1(c)(1− F1(c))N−1(1−G(β1(c)))− β′1(c)η(β1(c)− c)(1− F1(c))N−1g(β1(c))
−η(β1(c)− c)(N − 1)(1− F1(c))N−2f1(c)(1−G(β1(c))) = 0 (A.7)
We can write the differential equation in the following form,
d
dc












For j > 1 case, the differential equation becomes,
d
dc
















A.2.2 Proof for Theorem 2
In round j, let Numj =
∫ s∗j−1
c
((1 − Fj(x))N−1(G(s∗j−1) − G(βj(x))))ηdx, Den = ((1 −
Fj(c))


















< 0, since φj(x) < φj(c)
A.2.3 Proof for Theorem 3
From lemma 1, I have the following objective function,
max
b











and the first order condition is,




























Define hazard rates for bid and reserve price λ(b) = h(b)1−H(b) and ν(r|s) =
g(r)
G(s)−G(r) ,
0 = (b− c)
1
η−1 − (N − 1)λ(b)ν(r|s∗j−1)η(b− c)
1
η − η(b− c)
1
η + δE(V (s∗j |s∗j−1))





















m(·) is the density of the smallest order statistic in the other N − 1 bids.
First of all, by symmetry, the probability of bidder i wins in round j is





in which, r0 denotes the secret reserve price, and H(·) denotes the distribution of the bids. Let
B(N−1) = min{b−i}, and M(·) denotes the distribution of this smallest order statistic of other N−1
bids. By definition, M(u) = 1 − (1 − H(u))N−1, and the corresponding density function has the
form m(u) = (1−N)(1−H(u))N−2h(u).
Hence, I can trivially get the probability that no one wins in round j given s∗j−1 by the following
arguments.





































A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1








in which, V(x) denote the (p− 1)-dimensional linear space of all vectors z ∈ Rp such that zTx = 0.
Let Ψ∗ denote the production set under the transformed coordinate systems. Under Assumption 1,
3 and 6, for any (z,y) ∈ Ψ∗(x) there exists γ > 0 such that (γ x||x|| + z,y) ∈ Ψ. The boundary of Ψ













For any v ∈ Rp+ we have v = x
T v
||x||2x+ z for z = v −
xT v








As seen in (3.6), under weak disposability, we have θ̂(x,y)θ(x,y) − 1 ≤ δn
− 2p+q+1 if and only if there exists
a β > 0 with βθ(x,y) − 1 ≤ δn
− 2p+q+1 such that
n∑
i=1
αiYi = yµy, and
n∑
i=1
αiXi = µxβx (A.20)
hold for some α1 ≥ 0, . . . , αn ≥ 0 with
∑n










x+ Zi by (A.19) (A.21)




























θ(x,y) . Given, µx > 0, let y
∗ = µyy and δ
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